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ABSTRACT 
January 19, 2012 
ESTIMATING THE VALUE AND INTEREST RATE RISK OF DEMAND DEPOSITS 
IN CONCENTRATED MARKETS 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to determine the value and interest rate risk of funds deposited in 
demand deposit accounts under imperfect competition among banks. The value of a demand 
deposit is divided into two components, which are rent and liability. The former is defined as 
the profit bank receives from accepting demand deposits (by paying rates below the short-
term market interest rate) and the latter as the nominal value of deposits minus the rent. The 
interest rate risk of demand deposits is measured by their sensitivity to shocks in the short-
term market interest rate. The analysis in this thesis is carried out from the viewpoint of a case 
bank, which is a Finnish commercial bank, and the Finnish banking sector as a whole. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Historical data is needed in this thesis in order to estimate the demand functions for deposits 
and the processes of the variables. Most of the data series span from January 2006 to 
December 2010, totaling 60 monthly observations. The data was obtained from three sources: 
the case bank’s databases, Bank of Finland, and Statistics Finland. Monte Carlo simulation is 
used in generating the value and interest rate risk estimates. A majority of the variables are 
modeled as AR(2)-processes, whereas the short-term market interest rate is modeled using a 
one-factor stochastic Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model. Moreover, various assumptions concerning 
deposit balance dynamics are taken into account in the analysis of case bank, whereas the 
analysis of the whole banking sector is carried out only under AR(2) forecasted balances. 
RESULTS 
The results indicate that several variables measuring macroeconomic environment and market 
concentration play an important role in determining the demand function for demand deposits. 
Also, it is found that both the case bank and the Finnish banking sector as a whole exercise 
market power, as both of them are able to generate significant positive rents from accepting 
demand deposits. However, the magnitude of these rents varies a lot depending on the 
assumed deposit balance dynamics. The largest rent estimates are obtained assuming that 
future deposit balances evolve according to AR(2) forecasts, whereas under constant and 
decaying balances the rents are substantially lower. Finally, I find the interest rate risk of 
demand deposits to be significant, as their valuations are sensitive to short-term market rate 
shocks under all deposit balance dynamics covered. 
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AVISTATALLETUSTEN ARVON JA KORKORISKIN MÄÄRITTÄMINEN 
KESKITTYNEILLÄ MARKKINOILLA 
TUTKIMUKSEN TAVOITTEET 
Tämän tutkimuksen tavoitteena on määrittää sekä case-pankin että suomalaisen 
pankkisektorin avistatalletusten arvo sekä niihin liittyvä korkoriski epätäydellisen kilpailun 
vallitessa markkinoilla. Talletuksen arvon määrittämisessä on otettava huomioon kummatkin 
siihen vaikuttavat komponentit, jotka ovat talletuspreemio ja vastuuarvo. Näistä ensimmäinen 
on pankin saama voitto, jonka se ansaitsee ottamalla avistatalletuksia vastaan ja maksamalla 
näille talletuksille korkoa, joka on lyhyttä markkinakorkoa alhaisempi. Talletuksen 
vastuuarvo saadaan puolestaan vähentämällä talletuspreemio talletuksen sen hetkisestä 
nimellisarvosta. Korkoriskiä mitataan tässä tutkimuksessa talletusten arvon herkkyydellä 
markkinakoron äkillisiin muutoksiin. 
AINEISTO JA MENETELMÄT 
Tutkimuksessa käytetään historiallista dataa talletusten kysyntäfunktioiden sekä muuttujien 
prosessien määrittämisessä. Suurin osa aikasarjoista koostuu kuukausittaisista havainnoista 
(60 kpl) aikaväliltä tammikuu 2006-joulukuu 2010. Aineisto on kerätty kolmesta lähteestä; 
case-pankilta, Suomen Pankista ja Tilastokeskukselta. Talletusten arvo- ja 
korkoriskiestimaattien määrittämisessä hyödynnetään Monte Carlo -simulaatiota. Suurinta 
osaa muuttujista kuvataan AR(2)-prosessien avulla, poikkeuksena kuitenkin lyhyt 
markkinakorko, jota mallinnetaan stokastisella Cox-Ingersoll-Ross-mallilla. Case-pankin 
analyysissa otetaan huomioon useita vaihtoehtoisia talletuskannan kehityksen skenaarioita, 
kun taas koko pankkisektorin tarkastelussa talletusten oletetaan kasvavan AR(2)-ennusteen 
mukaisesti. 
TULOKSET 
Tulokseni osoittavat, että useat makrotaloudelliset sekä pankkisektorin keskittyneisyyttä 
mittaavat muuttujat ovat merkittäviä avistatalletusten kysynnän määrittäjiä. Tulokseni 
tarjoavat evidenssiä myös siitä, että sekä case-pankki että suomalainen pankkisektori 
kokonaisuudessaan käyttävät markkinavoimaa, sillä kummankin avistatalletuskannan arvosta 
talletuspreemio muodostaa merkittävän osan. Talletuspreemion suuruus riippuu kuitenkin 
oletetusta talletuskannan kehityksestä. Suurimmat talletuspreemiot saavutetaan talletuskannan 
kehittyessä AR(2)-ennusteen mukaisesti, kun taas tasaisen ja pienenevän talletuskannan 
oletuksella ne ovat huomattavasti pienempiä. Tulokseni osoittavat myös, että avistatalletusten 
korkoriski on merkittävä, sillä niiden arvostukset ovat herkkiä lyhyen markkinakoron 
äkillisille muutoksille riippumatta oletetusta talletuskannan kehityksestä. 
AVAINSANAT 
Pankkien vastuiden hallinta, markkinan keskittyneisyys, avistatalletukset, korkoriski 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The basic function of deposit banks is to create maturity mismatch between its assets and 
liabilities by obtaining funding from the side of public having excess funds and using these 
funds to grant loans to the side in deficit. If it is assumed that banks are able to invest their 
cash at the market interest rate, they make profits from both deposits and loans by paying 
rates below the market rate to depositors and charging rates above the market rate from the 
borrowers. Banks have two main sources of short-term funding available, which are deposits 
and money market securities, such as certificates of deposit. Deposits can be further divided 
into two main categories, which are term deposits and demand deposits. Under a term deposit 
contract the depositor agrees to keep the money in the bank for a predetermined time, but 
demand deposits can be withdrawn by the depositor at any time with no cost. 
Funds deposited in demand deposit accounts, or DDAs, contain some distinctive 
characteristics from a bank’s point of view. While depositors consider them as extremely 
liquid investments, banks face challenges in measuring their sufficiency, value, and exposure 
to different risks. These challenges arise because the contractual maturity of DDAs is zero, 
but in practice their balances remain more or less stable in banks’ balance sheets over time, 
causing their practical maturities to be substantially in excess of zero. Since these deposits do 
not have market prices available either, the standard practice has been to value them simply at 
their nominal values in banks’ balance sheets. 
DDAs play an important role in the overall funding of Finnish banks, as the DDA market in 
Finland totalled approximately 70 billion euros in the end of 2010, representing some 15 % of 
the banks’ total liabilities. The banking sector in Finland is also characterized by a high 
degree of concentration, which increases the possibility that banks exercise market power. 
Bank market power within the DDA market can be inferred from the rents banks obtain from 
accepting these deposits. The deposit rent is defined as the spread between the short-term 
market rate and the deposit rate set by the bank multiplied by the nominal value of deposits in 
the bank’s balance sheet, whereas deposits’ liability value is obtained by subtracting the rent 
from the nominal value of deposits. The greater (smaller) these rents are, the more (less) 
banks exercise market power in the DDA market. Naturally, the presence of bank market 
power and deposit rents has to be taken into consideration in the valuation and risk 
measurement of DDAs. 
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1.1. Objective and Contribution of the Thesis 
The objective of this thesis is to measure the value and interest rate risk of DDAs while taking 
into account several macroeconomic considerations and imperfect competition among banks 
as well. An additional aim is to clarify which factors determine the public’s demand for 
DDAs and, thus, have to be taken into account in the valuation and risk management 
procedures. Also, the effects of assumed deposit balance dynamics on DDA valuation and 
interest rate risk estimates is covered, as several different scenarios for future evolvement of 
DDA levels are studied. The base case scenario in previous papers has been to assume that 
deposit balances remain constant over time, but this thesis, on the other hand, focuses on the 
effects of decaying and growing balances as well. The analysis in this thesis is carried out for 
a Finnish case bank and, to some extent, the Finnish banking sector as a whole. The case bank 
studied here is a relatively young commercial bank, which has been growing faster than the 
sector during the recent years. This historical difference in the pace of growth leads to the last 
objective of this thesis, which is to examine how the expected future deposit balance growth 
rate affects the value and interest rate risk estimates of DDAs. 
The general theoretical framework of banks’ profit maximization used in this thesis is similar 
as in Hutchison and Pennacchi (1996) and the methodology used to obtain the DDA value and 
interest rate risk estimates is Monte Carlo simulation. Interest rate risk of these deposits is 
measured by the sensitivity of their value to term structure slope shocks in the market interest 
rate. The short-term market rate, which is considered as the only source of risk in the 
valuation procedure, is modeled as a one-factor stochastic Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process and the 
other variables are modeled as autoregressive AR(2) processes. Moreover, Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression is used in estimating the DDA demand functions. 
Two research hypotheses are tested in this thesis. The first one of these, denoted by H1, 
concerns the banks’ ability to generate profits from DDAs, whereas the second hypothesis 
(H2) focuses on the interest rate sensitivity of DDAs. The two hypotheses are defined as 
follows: 
H1: Banks exercise market power and thus earn positive rents from their DDAs. 
H2: DDA rates do not perfectly adjust to interest rate shocks, thus causing a positive 
term structure slope shock to increase the value of DDA rents. 
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Both of these research hypotheses stem from theories of market concentration, and to be more 
precise, from structure-performance hypothesis and efficient structure hypothesis. The basic 
logic of both of them is that prices are less favorable to consumers in more concentrated 
markets.1 The statistical test used to test H1 and H2 is a one-sided z-test. 
This thesis provides several contributions, both from academic and practical perspective. 
First, most of the previous papers studying deposit rents and interest rate risk concentrate on 
the U.S. banking sector, whereas only little attention is paid to the European banks. This is an 
important gap to fill, since the role of banks is more crucial in the bank-centered European 
economies compared to the market-centered U.S. economy. This thesis is, at least to the best 
of my knowledge, the first paper concentrating on Finnish environment. 
The second contribution to existing research is that this thesis provides additional insights to 
the role of deposit balance dynamics in the valuation and risk measurement of DDAs. This is 
done by studying three alternative scenarios of deposit balance dynamics, which are growing 
deposits, constant deposits, and decaying deposits. The third academic contribution of this 
thesis is the additional focus put on macroeconomic and banking sector competition aspects. 
Previous papers mainly assume that deposit demand is affected only by the market interest 
rate and the deposit interest rate set by the bank, but this thesis includes macroeconomic and 
market concentration factors as determinants of deposit demand as well. 
From the case bank’s point of view, this thesis provides practical contributions. First, the bank 
receives an assessment of its DDA risk position. The valuation and risk measurement of 
DDAs is somewhat challenging and time-consuming, but altogether essential in order to fully 
understand the characteristics of these deposits. Second, this thesis is aimed to serve as a 
guideline for further refinements in the case bank’s liability management procedures. This is 
an issue of first-order importance, since the risk management practices of banks worldwide 
are being reconsidered after the recent banking crisis and banks need to have a solid 
understanding about the risks they are exposed to in order to adapt to the new regulatory 
environment. 
 
                                                           
1
 See, e.g. Berger and Hannan (1989) and Goldberg and Rai (1996) for further information on structure-
performance hypothesis and efficient structure hypothesis. Also, Chapter 2.1. of this thesis covers the principles 
of the concepts. 
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1.2. Results 
The results indicate that strong evidence supporting both H1 and H2 is found, as all the rent 
and interest rate risk estimates under different deposit balance dynamics are significant at the 
1 % level. I find that the mean rent for the case bank equals 19.66 % under constant deposits, 
61.70 % under growing deposits, and 1.55-8.10 % under decaying deposits, depending on the 
decay rate. For the banking sector only the case of growing deposits is covered, under which 
the mean rent equals 32.90 %. The interest rate risk estimates under +100 bps (+200 bps) 
shock, i.e. the change in the value of rent due to a given market rate shock, for the case bank 
range between 4.07 % and 52.10 % (8.18-98.37 %), depending on the assumed DDA balance 
dynamics. For the banking sector and under growing deposit balances the estimate obtained is 
6.28 % for +100 bps shock and 12.67 % for a +200 bps shock. 
The results obtained in this thesis are somewhat well in line with previous research. My 
results on the magnitude of DDA rents are similar to the results by O’Brien (2000), as I find 
that under constant deposit balances the average rent for the case bank equals 19.66 % and the 
results of O’Brien indicate a rent of 21.10 % under the same assumptions. However, the 
magnitude of these rent estimates are somewhat different in Hutchison and Pennacchi (1996) 
and Dewachter et al. (2006), as the former finds the average rent to be lower and the latter 
finds it to be substantially greater. Despite the differences in the magnitude of rent estimates, 
the conclusion in previous research and in this thesis is the same, i.e. deposit rents constitute a 
significant part of the deposit value, causing the liability value of deposits to be lower than 
their nominal value. Moreover, the results considering the interest rate risk of deposits are 
similar in this thesis compared to previous research, as I find that a positive term structure 
slope shock increases (decreases) the value of DDA rent (liability). 
 
1.3. Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis proceeds in the following manner. In Chapter 2, I present a review of the previous 
literature related to banking sector concentration, deposit valuation, and measuring the risk 
characteristics of deposits. After that, the methodology used in this thesis is thoroughly 
described in Chapter 3, followed by an introduction to data and variables in Chapter 4. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, I present the results obtained in this thesis and discuss their implications 
from several viewpoints. Chapter 6 concludes. 
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2. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
In this chapter I discuss the previous research related to this thesis. First, the research focusing 
on market concentration in banking sector and competition between banks is covered. Second, 
I introduce the relevant papers from the area of valuing deposit rents and liabilities. Third, the 
literature related to modeling market interest rates is covered. After that, the focus will be on 
studies concentrating on interest rate risk of deposits. Finally, in the last section, I present an 
overview of the studies focusing on deposit balance dynamics and the factors affecting 
deposit demand. An important concept related to balance dynamics, bank runs, is also covered 
in the last section. 
 
2.1. Market Concentration in Banking Sector 
Market competition and concentration have been popular subjects among academics for 
decades. In his seminal paper, Demsetz (1973) points out that a majority of prior empirical 
research focused on identifying monopolies within a given industry, and these papers had a 
desire to be policy-relevant. He also states that studying market concentration can provide 
other fruitful topics for research as well. Demsetz identifies two fundamental sources of 
market concentration, namely the superior ability of few firms to produce and market their 
products and the superiority of an industry structure in which there are only a few firms. The 
former of these sources of concentration can be viewed as an endogenous factor, whereas the 
latter has a more exogenous nature. 
Berger et al. (2004) provide a comprehensive review on the studies focusing specially on 
banking sector concentration and competition. Their paper stems from the fact that the 
consolidation of banks around the globe in recent years has intensified the public policy 
discussions on the influences of market concentration. As they compare old and new research 
in that area, they conclude that while the older research focuses on market concentration and 
bank performance, the emphasis of the newer research is on credit availability and financial 
stability - topics of first-order importance. 
Examples of recent studies on bank competition and market concentration are provided in, 
e.g., Kano et al. (2006), Hays et al. (2009), and Fernández et al. (2010). Kano et al. focus on 
the credit availability issue mentioned in Berger et al. (2004) as they investigate the benefits 
from bank-borrower relationships for a sample of Japanese small- and medium-sized 
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enterprises. They hypothesize that these benefits vary due to three factors identified in the 
theoretical literature: verifiability of information, bank size and complexity, and banking 
sector competition. They find that their sample firms benefit most from bank-borrower 
relationships when they do not have audited financial statements (i.e. their company 
information is less transparent) and when they borrow from small banks in less competitive 
markets. Hays et al., on the other hand, focus on the banks’ viewpoint. They examine the 
impact of market concentration on the yield on assets and the cost of funds for American 
commercial banks and find that market concentration has no significant impact on them. 
Finally, Fernández et al. relate banking sector concentration to economic growth and financial 
stability, as they analyze how the effect of concentration on economic growth varies across 
countries depending on bank regulation, supervision, and institutions. They find that banking 
sector concentration has a negative effect on economic growth and that tighter restrictions on 
bank activities reduce this effect. 
Traditional structure-performance and subsequent efficient structure hypotheses constitute 
two essential concepts concerning banking sector concentration. The assumption under the 
former is that non-competitive pricing behavior explains the positive correlation between 
market concentration and profitability, whereas the latter assumes that it is explained by the 
greater efficiency of firms with dominant market shares (Berger and Hannan, 1989). Under 
both structure-performance hypothesis and efficient structure hypothesis, prices are less 
favorable to consumers in more concentrated markets. However, Berger and Hannan state that 
they differ in terms of the structural model behind the phenomenon. Structure-performance 
hypothesis assumes that concentration is exogenous resulting in noncompetitive behavior, 
whereas the efficient structure hypothesis takes firm-specific efficiencies as exogenous and 
these efficiencies result in both more concentrated markets and noncompetitive prices. Both 
of these hypotheses are tested in Goldberg and Rai (1996) in the context of European banks. 
Their results support the efficient structure hypothesis for banks located in countries with low 
market concentration, whereas no significant evidence is found to support the structure-
performance hypothesis. 
Another relevant research area from the viewpoint of this thesis is the banks’ deposit interest 
rate setting behavior in the presence of imperfect competition among banks. This question is 
in the heart of the study by Neumark and Sharpe (1992) as they examine the asymmetric 
deposit interest rate adjustments to changes in market interest rates. They find that banks in 
concentrated markets are slower to raise deposit interest rates in response to rising market 
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interest rates, but faster to reduce them in response to declining market interest rates. Thus, 
banks with market power profit from market interest rate movements in both directions. 
Neumark and Sharpe conclude that since deposit interest rates are inversely related to the 
price charged by banks for deposits, their results suggest that downward price rigidity and 
upward price flexibility are consequences of market concentration. Martín-Oliver (2008) 
extends the deposit interest rate analysis by studying the competition among Spanish banks in 
terms of three output components, namely loans, deposits, and commissions. He recognizes 
the imperfect competition within banking sector as well, but also states that the competition in 
loan and deposit markets has increased during the period from 1989 to 2003. 
In a somewhat recent paper, Vajanne (2009) tests for the existence of bank market power in 
euro area countries by employing data on demand deposit interest rates and corresponding 
market interest rates. Her results suggest that despite country specific differences, there exists 
a general pattern of banks exercising market power within the euro area and the reactions of 
deposit interest rates to market interest rate movements are clearly asymmetric, i.e. flexible 
when market rates are decreasing and rigid when they are increasing. Finally, Kahn et al. 
(1999) introduce a slightly different kind of consequence stemming from bank market power. 
They argue that retail deposit interest rates cluster around integers and fractions, and propose 
a theory based on the “limited recall” of retail depositors to explain this. Their theory suggests 
that deposit interest rates are sticky at their integer levels and the propensity for integer rates 
increases with the level of market interest rates and deposit market concentration. They also 
argue that when banks set non-integer rates, they are more likely to be just above, rather than 
just below, integers. Moreover, they find strong empirical support for the theory’s 
implications. 
 
2.2. Deposit Rents 
As discussed in the previous section, the banking sector is typically concentrated which leads 
banks to exercise market power. One sign of this market power that the literature suggests is 
the rents banks receive from accepting deposits. In the presence of market power, banks set 
their deposit interest rates below the short-term market interest rate and thus receive positive 
net cash flows from accepting deposits. Hutchison and Pennacchi (1996) state that the value 
banks obtain from deposit rents equals the present value of all stochastic cash flows they 
receive in all futures dates, and this value is a part of the banks’ “going concern value” or 
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“charter value”. In their paper, Hutchison and Pennacchi estimate Negotiable Order of 
Withdrawal (NOW) and Money Market Deposit (MMDA) account rents for more than 200 
U.S. commercial banks. Instead of measuring deposit rents as plain dollar values, they present 
them as present values of all future rents per initial deposit balance. There is some divergence 
between banks in their results, but the median rents per deposit equal 6.55 % for NOW 
accounts and 7.88 % for MMDAs. Moreover, for simplicity reasons Hutchison and Pennacchi 
assume that the only source of risk in the valuation of rents is the movements in short term 
market interest rate, which is assumed to fluctuate according to a Vasicek model. These 
changes in short-term market interest rate cause the banks’ current profitability of deposits to 
vary in time and hence the deposit rents can be viewed as stochastic from a single bank’s 
point of view. 
Jarrow and van Deventer (1998) contribute to the literature by extending the analysis by 
Hutchison and Pennacchi (1996) by valuing credit card loans in addition to demand deposits. 
Whereas Hutchison and Pennacchi use an equilibrium-based approach, the model of Jarrow 
and van Deventer is based on arbitrage-free pricing methodology. Moreover, they employ a 
“market segmentation” argument to justify differences between market interest rates and the 
rates paid (charged) on demand deposits (credit card loans). According to the argument only 
banks, not individual investors can accept demand deposits and grant credit card loans, but 
both of them can trade in frictionless and competitive Treasury security markets. 
An important aspect in valuing deposit rents, which is the asymmetric adjustment of deposit 
rates to market rate changes, is taken into account in O’Brien (2000). Similarly as in Jarrow 
and van Deventer (1998), O’Brien uses an arbitrage-free pricing method that models deposit 
rents as interest rate contingent claims. He also states that widely used autoregressive models 
may be suitable for forecasting near-term deposit rents, but they are less suitable for longer-
term rent forecasts. Whereas Hutchison and Pennacchi (1996) present an analytical solution 
for estimating rents, O’Brien uses numerical methods for this purpose, i.e. Monte Carlo 
simulation over a 30-year horizon. Assuming fixed deposit balances, he finds that (i) under 
asymmetric adjustment of deposit rates to changes in the market rate the median rent per 
deposit across all 74 sample banks equals 21.10 % for NOW accounts and 12.20 % for 
MMDAs and (ii) under symmetric adjustment, the median is 15.30 % for NOWs and 10.90 % 
for MMDAs. Since partial adjustment of deposit rates with relation to changes in market rate 
is likely to occur when banks exercise market power, one can conclude from the results of 
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O’Brien that the profitability of deposits is negatively related to the level of competition in the 
market. 
The work by both Hutchison and Pennacchi (1996) and O’Brien (2000) use data on U.S. 
banks, but the issue is of great interest in the bank-centered European economies as well. 
Dewachter et al. (2006) strive to fill this gap by examining the rents for a sample of Belgian 
banks’ retail savings deposits accounts. They extend the previous analyses by studying 
deposit rents and liability values under different deposit withdrawal or decay rates and 
servicing costs. Their results indicate that (i) for a base case (servicing cost equals 0 % and 
withdrawal rate 15 %) the average deposit rent equals 22.60 % and (ii) for varying decay rates 
and servicing costs it ranges from 4.40 % to 47.80 %, where the greatest value is obtained 
with constant deposits (i.e. zero decay rate) and zero servicing costs. They find that deposit 
rents constitute and economically and statistically significant component of savings deposits, 
even though their valuations are sensitive to assumptions about servicing costs and 
outstanding balances’ decay rates. Furthermore, they argue that deposit liability values 
depreciate significantly when market rates increase and, thus, offset some of the value losses 
on the asset side. 
 
2.3. Interest Rate Models 
Models for short-term interest rates can be roughly divided into two categories: one-factor 
and multi-factor models. The assumption under the former is that there is only one stochastic 
factor driving the process, i.e. there is only one source of risk, whereas the models in the latter 
category contain multiple risk sources. The literature related to valuing deposits and 
estimating their risk typically assumes that the interest rates evolve according to the one-
factor models, and, thus, this section concentrates on three most widely used models in that 
category. These are the Vasicek model (1977), Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model (1985), and Hull-
White model (1990). 
Vasicek (1977) was the first to introduce an interest rate model incorporating mean reversion, 
which means that the process strives towards its long-term mean. This is a very essential 
assumption in modeling interest rates, since it is not reasonable to assume that they could rise 
or descend indefinitely. Vasicek model has two components, which can be viewed as “drift” 
and “shock” components. Both of these components contain two elements: the drift 
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component is determined by (i) the speed of mean reversion and (ii) the spread between the 
long term mean level of the process and the current interest rate. The shock component, on the 
other hand, is determined by (i) volatility of the process and (ii) a Wiener process that is 
intended to model the sole source of market risk. However, as pointed out in Hull and White 
(1990), there is a fundamental disadvantage in the Vasicek model, which is that the short-term 
interest rate being modeled can become negative. Obviously, this is not likely to occur with 
actual interest rates. 
The problem of Vasicek model’s negative interest rates is taken into account in the model by 
Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985). Essentially the model is very similar to the Vasicek model, 
as they both are mean reverting, continuous time first-order autoregressive processes. 
However, the key difference lies in modeling the shock component of the process. Whereas 
the Vasicek model assumes that the magnitude of shocks does not depend on the current level 
of the state variable, i.e. short-term interest rate, the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model does make this 
assumption. To put it differently, the volatility of the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process is 
conditional on the current level of the state variable. In practice, when the interest rate is close 
to zero, the magnitude of the shock is small, causing the smallest possible value for the state 
variable to be zero. If the interest rate becomes zero, the next shock has a zero effect and the 
drift component of the model causes the interest rate to rise. 
Hull and White (1990) further develop the two aforementioned models. Depending on 
whether the shock component of the model is assumed to be conditional on the state variable 
or not, the Hull-White model can be considered as an extension of either Vasicek or Cox-
Ingersoll-Ross model. The main difference between Hull-White model and the previous two 
models is the increased time-dependence included in the process. To be more precise, Hull 
and White add a time-dependent drift term to the process for the short rate, and allow the 
speed of mean reversion and volatility to be functions of time. Moreover, Hull and White 
highlight the practical attractiveness of the extended Vasicek model because of its easy 
analytic tractability. They also compare the performance of the extended Vasicek model with 
the one-factor Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model and with two different two-factor models by testing 
whether the option prices given by their model are similar to those given by other models. By 
fitting all the models to the same initial term structure of interest rates, the same term 
structure of interest rate volatilities and the same data on the expected future instantaneous 
standard deviation of the short rate, their results suggest that the differences between the 
option prices produced by the models are small. 
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2.4. Interest Rate Risk of Deposits 
Banks generating maturity transformation between their short-term liabilities and long-term 
assets face several risks. These risks are well summarized by Kalkbrener and Willing (2004), 
as they divide them to credit risk, interest rate risk, and liquidity risk. In this section, I will 
focus on the literature covering the interest rate risk of demand deposits. As pointed out by 
Jarrow and van Deventer (1992), understanding the risk characteristics of these deposits play 
a major role in successful liability management of deposit banks. 
Studies focusing on risk management of non-maturing liabilities, such as demand deposits, 
are of great practical importance. However, a number of authors agree on the fact that 
theoretical research on the subject has proceeded somewhat slowly (see, e.g., Jarrow and van 
Deventer, 1998; O’Brien, 2000; and Kalkbrener and Willing, 2004). A widely used method in 
quantifying the interest rate risk associated with deposits is the duration measure introduced 
by Cox et al. (1979).2 This measure is used by Hutchison and Pennacchi (1996), and they 
state that the current profitability of deposits varies with market rate movements due to 
imperfect competition in the deposit market, and a proper measure of deposit duration must 
incorporate these changes in profit stream values. The results of Hutchison and Pennacchi 
indicate that the median duration for NOW accounts is 6.69 years and for MMDAs 0.37 
years. Keeping in mind that zero duration occurs only when the retail deposit market is fully 
competitive, it can be inferred that the NOW accounts face a less competitive environment 
than MMDAs. 
An equivalent concept of duration is used also by O’Brien (2000), who points out that the 
Cox et al. (1979) concept of duration can be viewed as the maturity of a zero-coupon bond 
with the same interest rate elasticity as the deposit value. He presents his duration results 
under symmetric and asymmetric adjustment of deposit rates to market rate changes and 
shows also how a given market rate shock affects the estimates. The results indicate that 
under fixed deposit balances and asymmetric adjustment, the duration for NOW accounts 
ranges from -0.70 to 1.28 years, depending on the interest rate shock assumed. The shocks 
                                                           
2
 The measure is not the same as Macaulay duration, since it is not based on permanent market rate shocks and 
parallel shifts in the yield curve. For more information on the subject see Cox et al. (1979). Moreover, Hutchison 
and Pennacchi (1996) state that theories of term structure of interest rates, which provide the basis for interest 
rate risk measures such as Macaulay duration, assume that security prices are determined in perfectly 
competitive markets. They also argue that this competitive market paradigm is less defensible for many financial 
instruments, e.g. demand deposits. 
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concerned are from -300 to +300 bps with 50 bps intervals, where the smallest duration is 
assigned to the largest negative and the greatest duration to the largest positive shock. Under 
symmetric adjustment, the duration estimates range from 0.14 to 0.19 years. The MMDA 
durations range from -0.17 to 0.64 years under asymmetric adjustment and from 0.13 to 0.17 
under symmetric adjustment. Comparing to the results of Hutchison and Pennacchi (1996), 
these NOW account and MMDA duration estimates are fairly small. O’Brien also covers the 
hedging of deposit interest rate risk and states that the interest rate risk of deposit values will 
be hedged if the bank’s assets have the same durations as that for the deposit liabilities for a 
given market rate shock. However, O’Brien also emphasizes that those short-term assets 
hedging changes in deposit values will not hedge cash flow uncertainty associated with 
deposits. 
In addition to duration, O’Brien (2000) uses another measure for interest rate risk, which is 
the deposit value’s interest rate sensitivity. This measure is defined as the percentage change 
in the deposit liability value due to a given market rate shock. It is reasonable to calculate 
interest rate sensitivity measures for the deposit rents as well, as they can reveal important 
information about the dynamics of rent forecasts in the presence of stochastic interest rates. 
Again, O’Brien reports his results considering multiple scenarios for deposit balance 
dynamics, deposit rate adjustments, and interest rate shocks. He finds that under fixed 
deposits, asymmetric deposit rate adjustment, and positive market rate shocks the median 
interest rate sensitivity of NOW accounts ranges between -0.97 and -0.82 percentage points, 
depending on the interest rate shock assumed (from +50 to +300 bps with 50 bps intervals) so 
that the smallest value is affiliated with the largest shock. The respective range for MMDAs is 
from -0.56 to -0.42 percentage points. Other things being equal but under symmetric 
adjustment, the interest rate sensitivity for NOW accounts (MMDAs) ranges from -0.18 to -
0.16 (from -0.16 to -0.15) percentage points. As these results indicate, the interest rate risk of 
deposits depends heavily on the assumption of deposit rate adjustment to market rate shocks. 
Also, because the range of the results is wider in the case of asymmetric adjustment, it can be 
concluded that interest rate risk increases with bank market power. 
Dewachter et al. (2006) use a similar sensitivity measure for interest rate risk as O’Brien 
(2000). They present their results for different servicing cost-decay rate combinations and 
find that the average interest rate sensitivity for Belgian banks’ savings deposits ranges from -
3.77 % to -3.18 %. For a base case (servicing cost 0 % and decay rate 15 %), the bank-
specific interest rate elasticity ranges from -3.95 % to -3.54 %, whereas the average for the 
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sample is -3.77 %. These results should be interpreted so that deposit liability (rent) values 
depreciate (appreciate) when market rates increase. Dewachter et al. also point out that the 
precise hedging characteristics depend on the decay rate assumptions and to a large extent on 
the nature of the assumed interest rate shock, but in general the changes in deposit liability 
values are likely to offset some of the value losses on the asset side. 
Understanding the characteristics of demand deposits’ interest rate risk is also essential for 
bank regulators and supervisors. Dewachter et al. (2006) analyze the treatment of demand 
deposits under the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS 39 Financial 
Instruments: Recognition and Measurement) and state that the practice of assuming equality 
between fair and nominal value of demand deposits can be problematic. This relationship is 
quite controversial, because it is inconsistent with banks’ actual risk management practices 
and implies that demand deposits’ fair values are completely insensitive to interest rate 
changes. 
Entrop et al. (2009) study the robustness of the standardized framework proposed by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004) to quantify the interest rate risk of banks. 
The committee suggests calculating the interest rate risk on the basis of time bands, which 
show the outstanding amount of interest rate sensitive assets and liabilities broken down by 
their remaining time to maturity or re-pricing period. The suggested treatment for demand 
deposits is that these positions should be slotted into the time bands according to the guidance 
of national supervisors, but so that their assumed economic maturity does not exceed 5 years. 
Next, a measure for interest rate risk is calculated using modified durations assigned to each 
time band (assuming a yield of 5 %). Entrop et al. generalize this framework and study how 
the estimated level of interest rate risk changes if the assumptions of the standardized 
framework are violated. Their results indicate that interest rate risk estimates under the 
framework are very sensitive to its assumptions and therefore they should be treated with 
caution when used for supervisory and risk management purposes. 
 
2.5. Deposit Balance Dynamics 
It is essential to accurately understand the deposit balance dynamics in order to reliably 
estimate the value and interest rate risk of demand deposits. Often changes in DDA balances 
can be seen as stochastic from the bank’s point of view and, according to Jarrow and van 
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Deventer (1998), this stochastic growth is a major confounding factor in the valuation of 
deposits. A standard assumption in the research focusing on valuation of deposit rents and 
estimating their interest rate risk is that deposit balances remain constant through time 
(Hutchison and Pennacchi, 1996; and O’Brien, 2000). This makes interpretation of the results 
straightforward, but may be an oversimplifying assumption on the other hand. Dewachter et 
al. (2006) tackle this problem by presenting their results for a range of plausible, constant, 
annual deposit balance decay rates. Furthermore, they state that the valuation of both current 
and expected future deposits is a more challenging exercise, because it is difficult to forecast 
the future demand for deposits. 
Many factors play a role in determining the dynamics of deposit balances and several issues 
have to be taken into account when estimating their future fluctuations. In practice, the key 
issue is to identify the variables that significantly affect the demand for deposits. Even though 
the focus in Hutchison and Pennacchi (1996) is in measuring deposit rents and interest rate 
risk under constant deposit balances, their analysis does cover the estimation of retail deposit 
demand function. Their model defines the quantity of retail deposits demanded as a function 
of short-term market rate, deposit interest rate set by the bank, and a set of other variables that 
reflect the local market conditions. However, for analytical simplicity they leave the variables 
measuring local market conditions out of their analysis. O’Brien (2000) extends the analysis 
by Hutchison and Pennacchi by taking into account other factors in determining the demand 
for demand deposits. He models bank deposit balances by autoregressive processes that are 
assumed to satisfy a household desired balances equation such as used in money demand 
equations. In addition to a lagged balance variable, his autoregressive model contains one 
variable for the spread between market rate and deposit rate and another to measure the 
bank’s income. O’Brien points out that using this autoregressive demand function for 
deposits, the predicted deposit growth is high, which greatly increases longer-term rents. 
The deposit demand specification presented in O’Brien (2000) is not based on any theoretical 
model and Nyström (2008) makes an attempt to overcome this challenge by developing a 
framework under which deposit volumes are modeled in a theoretically sound way. His 
framework focuses on the behavior of depositors and the model for deposit demand takes into 
account the market rate, the deposit rates, and several customer processes. These processes 
are (i) the total volume deposited in a transactions account, (ii) the total volume deposited in a 
savings account, and (iii) how a customer divides the volume deposited in savings accounts 
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into different accounts. The last of these processes addresses the question of internal 
migrations of savings accounts’ volumes. 
Another important issue to consider in determining dynamics for deposit balances is 
macroeconomic risk. This issue is examined in Levy-Yeyati et al. (2010). They argue that 
depositors seem responsive to macroeconomic risk in a broader sense than that often 
considered by the literature and during crises it becomes more important determinant of 
deposit demand than traditional bank-specific characteristics. Also, differences in deposit 
withdrawals across banks can be explained by their different exposures to macroeconomic 
factors. Levy-Yeyati et al. use two variables to describe macroeconomic risk, one variable for 
country risk and one for exchange rate risk.3 However, they also highlight that during 
favorable times, macroeconomic factors are mostly insignificant in explaining depositor 
behavior. 
Bank runs are a particular case of interest in examining the dynamics of deposits balances. A 
bank run takes place when all depositors panic and withdraw their deposits simultaneously, 
including even those who would prefer to leave their deposits in the bank if they were not 
concerned about the bank failing (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Chari and Jagannathan (1988) 
agree that this kind of contagion effect, where general public’s observations of large 
withdrawals from the banking system result in even larger withdrawals of deposits, can be 
viewed as a trigger for bank runs. However, their model also presents two alternative reasons 
for deposit withdrawals. First, they argue that withdrawals occur when some of the depositors 
get adverse information about the prospects of the bank. In this case, also the uninformed 
depositors may observe this and thus have an incentive to liquidate their deposits. Second, 
Chari and Jagannathan state that some individuals need to withdraw their deposits for other 
than information-based reasons, for example if they are simply in need for liquidity. Thus, if 
by chance a large group of such depositors withdraw their deposits simultaneously, then the 
uninformed depositors will be misled causing an increasing probability of a bank run. 
Carmona (2007) argues in same vein and also points out that bank runs occur because both 
banks and depositors are illiquid. 
                                                           
3
 Levy-Yeyati et al. (2010) use data from Argentina and Uruguay. They measure country risk by the spread on 
Argentine and Uruguayan sovereign bonds over comparable U.S. bonds. Exchange rate risk is measured by the 
12-month forward exchange rate relative to the spot exchange rate for Argentina. For Uruguay, they use the 
spread of the average interest rate on peso time deposits relative to the rate on similar U.S. dollar deposits. 
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Another plausible reason for bank runs is presented in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), as they 
argue that the maturity mismatch between a bank’s assets and liabilities may expose it to the 
possibility of panic-based bank runs. They point out that even though the seminal, 
equilibrium-based, model by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) shows that the demand deposit 
contracts the banks offer expose them to bank runs, it is not able to provide tools to predict 
which equilibrium occurs and how likely each of them is. Goldstein and Pauzner address this 
issue by developing a modified version of the Diamond-Dybvig model, in which the 
fundamentals of economy determine the probability of a bank run. They find that the 
probability depends on the contract offered by the bank, i.e. banks become more vulnerable to 
runs when they offer more risk sharing.4 
An essential concept related to bank runs is asset fire sales, which means that a bank must 
liquidate some of its illiquid assets at a loss. A part of the deposits taken by a bank has to be 
kept in a very liquid form, since withdrawals of demand deposits are stochastic from a bank’s 
point of view, which indicates that they cannot be forecasted accurately. As stated in Franck 
and Krausz (2007), it is possible that at a given point in time, the bank’s liquid reserves do not 
cover the depositors’ desired withdrawals and under such circumstances asset fire sales are 
likely to take place. Furthermore, a distressed bank may be forced to liquidate all of its assets 
even if not all depositors withdraw, because the assets are sold at discounted prices (Diamond 
and Dybvig, 1983). Another feature of the asset fire sale process is that it is self-reinforcing, 
as pointed out by French et al. (2010). They state that if a bank is forced to sell its assets at 
fire sale prices, other banks may have to revalue their assets at these temporarily low market 
values as well. In other words, one distressed bank can cause problems to many others and, 
thus, reduce the financial system’s capacity to bear risk and make loans. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
4
 Risk sharing is basically a transfer of wealth from patient agents to impatient agents. Impatient agents can 
consume only in period 1 , whereas patient agents can consume either in period 1 or period 2 (the model assumes 
three periods: 0, 1, and 2). (Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005) 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
This chapter discusses the methodological issues related to this thesis. There are three 
important papers that form the basis for the methodology used here: Hutchison and Pennacchi 
(1996), O’Brien (2000), and Dewachter et al. (2006). The issues discussed in this chapter 
include the general theoretical model, Monte Carlo simulation, autoregressive processes, and 
stochastic processes. All the aforementioned jointly constitute the methodological foundation 
of this thesis. 
 
3.1. The General Model 
The basis of the methodology used in this thesis is the equilibrium-based model of bank’s 
profit maximization introduced in Hutchison and Pennacchi (1996). This model is founded on 
the assumption that banks operating in DDA markets face imperfect competition, and thus 
exercise market power. The market power of banks can be inferred from the fact that they are 
able to set their deposit rates below market rates so that their profits are maximized. Banks are 
assumed to know the deposit demand function they face, since otherwise they would not be 
able to set the deposit rate at the profit maximizing level. Under the model, the demand 
function for demand deposits is given by 
)),(),(),(()( txtrtrDtD d=  (1) 
where D(t) is the quantity of deposits demanded, r(t) is the short term market rate, rd(t) is the 
deposit interest rate set by the bank, and x(t) is a vector of other variables affecting the 
demand for deposits at date t. Due to analytical simplicity, Hutchison and Pennacchi leave x(t) 
out of their analysis. However, the assumption in this thesis is that several variables 
concerning market concentration and macroeconomic conditions play a role in determining 
the demand function for deposits. Moreover, there is a multicollinearity problem associated 
with the demand function when both the market rate and the deposit rate are included in the 
same equation and demand function is estimated using OLS regression. Therefore, instead of 
using the two interest rates independently, I follow the work of O’Brien (2000) and use the 
spread between them (r(t) - rd(t)) in my analysis. Hence, by using the spread Equation (1) can 
be expressed as follows: 
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The next step in the model is to define the optimization problem a bank faces under the 
assumption that the demand function for deposits is given by Equation (2). If it is further 
assumed that the bank can invest its deposits at the market rate, r(t), then at each time point 
the bank sets rd(t) as the value that maximizes the following equation: 
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where c(t) denotes the noninterest cost of accepting demand deposits. These noninterest costs 
are typically payment intermediation fees, the role of which has dramatically declined since 
the adaption of internet-based payment services. Because of this marginal role of c(t), it is 
assumed to be zero throughout the analysis. The solution, i.e. the profit maximizing spread 
between market rate and deposit rate, to Equation (3) is given by 
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If the DDA market is fully competitive, i.e. ∂D / ∂(r - rd) = ∞, the optimal spread would be 
zero and, thus, the optimal deposit rate would equal the market rate. In the presence of bank 
market power the demand for DDAs is not perfectly elastic and therefore the spread between 
the market rate and the deposit rate will be positive, indicating that the deposit rate is set 
below the market rate. 
After the profit maximizing spread between the market rate and deposit rate has been 
determined, the next step is to calculate the cash flows a bank receives from its deposits at 
some given time point. These cash flows represent the bank’s monthly DDA rents expressed 
in monetary terms. Given that the bank is able to invest its proceeds at the short-term market 
interest rate, r(t), this monthly rent is denoted by f(r(t),x(t)) and given by 
),()]())()([())(),(( * tDtctrtrtxtrf d −−=  (5) 
where (r(t) - rd(t))* is the optimal spread between market rate and deposit rate set by the bank. 
The next step in my analysis is to estimate the future monthly values for f(r(t),x(t)) (i.e. 
monthly rents) using Monte Carlo simulation and a 40-year simulation horizon. After that, the 
present value of future monthly rents (P0) is calculated using the corresponding simulated 
value of short-term market rate as a discount rate with each observation. The final DDA rent 
estimates examined in this thesis are expressed as percentages of initial deposit balance, and 
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this estimate is obtained by dividing the present value of future monthly rents by the DDA 
balance at t = 0 (P0/D0). Finally, after the rent estimates are obtained, DDA liability values 
(L0/D0) are calculated simply by subtracting the rent estimate from the nominal value of 
DDAs. 
After the rent and liability values are estimated for decaying, constant, and growing deposit 
balances, the associated interest rate risk is quantified. Interest rate risk of DDAs is measured 
by the sensitivity of rent and liability estimates to changes in the short-term market rate. To be 
more precise, +100 and +200 bps shocks are artificially placed to the first simulated 
observation for the market rate and the resulting changes in the rent and liability estimates are 
calculated. These changes in rent (∆P0/D0) and liability (∆L0/D0) estimates, measured as 
percentages, serve as DDAs’ interest rate risk estimates. 
 
3.2. Dynamics of Macroeconomic Variables and Deposit Balances 
The dynamics of the macroeconomic variables, market concentration variables, and growing 
deposit balances are modeled as autoregressive processes, as is also done in, e.g., O’Brien 
(2000). In this section, I present the principles of autoregressive models following the manner 
of representation in Brooks (2008). As stated by him, an autoregressive model is one where 
the current value of a variable, y, depends upon only the values that the variable took in 
previous periods plus an error term. In general, an autoregressive process of order p is 
denoted as AR(p) and expressed as 
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where µ is a constant and ut is a white noise error term. Autoregressive models can be further 
expanded to autoregressive moving average models, denoted by ARMA(p,q), where p is the 
order of autoregressive and q the order of moving average part of the model. An ARMA(p,q) 
model is expressed as follows: 
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In the equation presented, the autoregressive part is similar to that presented in Equation (6). 
The latter part, i.e. the moving average part, of the equation takes into account the 
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development of the white noise term so that the current value of yt depends also on the 
previous values of that term. So, under an ARMA(p,q) process, which is a combination of 
AR(p) and MA(q) processes, the current value of yt depends on (i) a constant, (ii) the previous 
values of y, (iii) the previous values of white noise term, and (iv) the current value of the 
white noise term. 
Stationarity of a series is a desired property when modeling a variable as an autoregressive 
process. If a non-stationary series is modeled with such a process, it has to be differenced one 
or more times before the model construction. A non-stationary series (y) is said to be 
integrated of order d, denoted as yt ~ I(d), if it has to be differenced d times before achieving 
stationarity. An ARIMA(p,d,q) model, where I stands for integrated, takes into account the 
problems associated with non-stationary time series. Moreover, it is also relevant to point out 
that an ARMA(p,q) model for a series differenced d times is equivalent to an ARIMA(p,d,q) 
model on the original data. For further information concerning ARIMA modeling of non-
stationary series, see Chapters 5 and 7 of Brooks (2008). 
Most of the variables’ historical data series studied in this thesis are characterized by non-
stationarity, which suggests that they should be modeled as ARIMA processes. To be more 
precise, these variables are modeled as ARIMA(2,1,0) processes, which is the same as an 
AR(2) process for a series that is differenced once. Following Equation (6), an AR(2) process 
for a variable y is given by 
.2211 tttt uyyy +++= −− φφµ  (8) 
In order the keep the analysis clear, I use the same process for every variable rather than 
building different ARIMA models for each of them. Moreover, after the autoregressive 
models are estimated in a sound manner, they can be used for forecasting purposes as well, as 
is done in this thesis. 
 
3.3. Dynamics of the Short-Term Market Rate 
As discussed in the literature review, there are several different models for estimating the 
dynamics of a short-term market rate. These can be divided into one-factor and multi-factor 
models, and traditionally the former class of models has been more popular in the research 
concerning deposit valuation and risk management. In particular, one-factor models are used 
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in Hutchison and Pennacchi (1996) and O’Brien (2000), where the former uses Vasicek and 
the latter Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model. A multi-factor approach is used in Dewachter et al. 
(2006), as they propose a multi-factor joint yield curve deposit rate model, in which bank 
deposit rates depend on both term structure and a deposit spread factor. 
According to established practice in the literature I use a one-factor model to estimate the 
dynamics of the short-term market rate. More specifically, the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model is 
used for that purpose. The main disadvantage of the seminal Vasicek model is that the interest 
rate process can obtain negative values, but this problem is taken into account in the Cox-
Ingersoll-Ross model so that the shock term of the model is conditional on the preceding level 
of the variable. In practice, it means that the closer the variable’s level is to zero, the less 
significant the subsequent shock effect is. If the variable achieves the value of zero, the next 
shock has no effect on the process, and the drift term of the process forces the next 
observation to be above zero. A discrete time version of the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model is 
given by the following equation: 
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where r is the short-term interest rate, κ(θ - rt-1) is the drift factor that ensures the mean 
reversion of the process towards its long-term mean θ, σ is the volatility of interest rate 
changes that is conditional on the square root of the variable’s preceding value, and zt is a 
normally distributed and stochastic Wiener process. In this thesis, I use monthly data and the 
volatility estimates are, thus, also monthly. This means that ∆t equals 1, and the model 
becomes more straightforward. 
Moreover, when the positive interest rate shocks are generated to the process, they are 
assumed to occur at the first simulated observation, i.e. the first month of the simulation 
horizon. This means that that at t = 1 Equation (9) is modified as follows: 
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where S1 denotes a +100 or +200 bps shock. Naturally, there are no shocks generated to 
subsequent observations, i.e. St equals zero for t > 1. Because of the mean-reverting nature of 
a Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process these artificially generated shocks will not last infinitely, which 
means that they will gradually die out during the following observations. The time it takes for 
the shock to vanish depends on the starting level of the process (r0), the volatility of the 
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interest rate (σ), and the drift factor. Only temporary (yield curve slope) shocks are considered 
in this thesis, but Equation (10) could be easily modified to take into account permanent 
(yield curve level) shocks as well, by assuming that St remains at the level of either +100 or 
+200 bps for t = {1, …, N}, where N is the last observation considered. 
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4. DATA AND VARIABLES 
This chapter presents the data and variables used in this thesis. The range for historical data 
needed varies, but in most cases it is from January 2006 to December 2010, totaling 60 
monthly observations. There are four categories to which the data are divided, which are (i) 
interest rates, (ii) demand deposit balances, (iii) macroeconomic data, and (iv) market 
concentration data. Next, I will first briefly introduce the data and variables according to this 
division, and in the end of this chapter some relevant summary statistics of all the variables 
are presented. 
 
4.1. Interest Rates 
There are three key series of interest rate data needed in the analysis. These are the short-term 
market interest rate, case bank’s DDA rate, and the average DDA rate in the Finnish banking 
sector. Next, the interest rate data is described and the exact variables are presented after that. 
A one month Euribor is used as a short-term market rate here, and its historical data, ranging 
from January 1987 to December 2010, was obtained from the database of Bank of Finland. 
These monthly observations are average monthly rates within a given month. It is also worth 
noticing that due to the introduction of Euribor rates in the beginning of 1999, the dataset 
actually consists of two interest rates, namely one month Helibor (January 1987-December 
1998) and one month Euribor (January 1999-December 2010). As will be discussed later in 
this thesis, a long series of historical data was needed for the market rate, because of the 
parameter estimation process of the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model. The variable constructed 
based on this data, RTEUR01, consists of observations between January 2006 and December 
2010. The complete series of one month Helibor/Euribor observations is presented in Figure 
1. 
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Figure 1: Historical development of one month Helibor/Euribor interest rate 
This figure presents the historical development of one month Helibor/Euribor interest rate. The data from 
January 1987 to December 1998 is for Helibor rate and from January 1999 to December 2010 for Euribor rate. 
Date (month/year) is presented in the X-axis and the interest rate in percentages in Y-axis. 
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The data for case bank specific DDA interest rates spans from January 2006 to December 
2010 and it was kindly provided by the case bank. Obtaining single monthly deposit rate 
observations was not as straightforward as in the case of market rate and, hence, some 
refinement of the data was needed. Challenges arise because the changes in deposit rates are 
largely discrete, which means that they are not constantly revised with respect to changes in 
the market rate5 and there are several different types of demand deposit accounts provided by 
the case bank. In order to overcome this challenge, I use the average monthly rates based on 
the individual rates of all different DDAs.6 Moreover, there are two variables constructed 
based on the case bank’s DDA rate data, which are RDT and RSPREAD. The former of these 
                                                           
5
 Often the deposit rate remains constant for a somewhat long period and then it is suddenly revised upwards or 
downwards. For example, the deposit rate can remain at, say, 2.00 % between dates t and t + n, and then increase 
to 2.20 % at date t + n + 1. 
6
 To further illustrate how each single monthly deposit rate observation is obtained, the following representation 
may prove to be useful. Consider that there are N different types of demand deposit accounts denoted by 1, 2, …, 
N, and the interest rates paid for each of these account types are denoted by X1, X2, …, XN, respectively. The first 
step is to obtain the average monthly deposit rates for each of these account types. This is simply done by 
summing all the daily observations of deposit rates within a given month, and then dividing it by the number of 
observations. These account type specific average deposit rates are denoted by µ1, µ2, …, µN. The final step in 
obtaining the average deposit rate for each month is to sum all the µi’s and divide this sum by N. 
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consists simply of average monthly deposit rate observations, whereas the latter is defined as 
RTEUR01 minus RDT. 
The last of the interest rate data series needed is for the average DDA rate within the whole 
Finnish banking sector. This data also ranges from January 2006 to December 2010 and it was 
obtained from the Bank of Finland’s database. However, the deposit rate data was only 
available separately for deposits made by households and corporate customers and, thus, in 
order to construct a single series of deposit rate observations the average of the household and 
corporate rates was calculated. This series of average rates is then used to construct the 
sector’s DDA rate variable, MFIRDT. Moreover, a spread variable defined as RTEUR01 
minus MFIRDT is also constructed and denoted by MFIRSPREAD. 
Figures 2 and 3 present the historical development of these variables introduced. Figure 2 
shows the graph concerning the interest rate variables, i.e. RTEUR01, RDT, and MFIRDT, 
whereas Figure 3 presents the resulting historical fluctuations in spread variables, i.e. 
RSPREAD and MFIRSPREAD. 
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Figure 2: Historical development of interest rate variables 
This figure presents the historical development of the interest rate variables used in this thesis. These variables 
are one month Euribor rate (RTEUR01), case bank’s demand deposit rate (RDT), and the average demand 
deposit rate within the whole Finnish banking sector (MFIRDT). Date (month/year) is presented in the X-axis 
and the interest rate in percentages in Y-axis. 
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Figure 3: Historical development of interest rate spread variables 
This figure presents the historical development of the interest rate spread variables used in this thesis. These 
variables are the spread between (i) short-term market rate and the case bank’s demand deposit rate (RSPREAD) 
and (ii) short-term market rate and the average demand deposit rate within the Finnish banking sector 
(MFIRSPREAD). Date (month/year) is presented in the X-axis and the interest rate spread in percentage points 
in Y-axis. 
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4.2. Deposit Balances 
The deposit balance data needed in this thesis consists of monthly DDA balance observations 
for both the case bank and the whole Finnish banking sector. Both of these historical time 
series consist of 60 monthly observations between January 2006 and December 2010. Case 
bank kindly shared its deposit balance data and the sector’s aggregate balances were obtained 
from the database of Bank of Finland. Moreover, since there are several classes of DDAs 
provided by the case bank, some additional calculations were needed in order to obtain single 
monthly observations to construct the series. However, this was a straightforward task as it 
was simply done by summing the individual accounts’ average monthly balances. The 
aggregate balances within the banking sector were readily available as such, thus no further 
calculations were needed with respect to that data. 
A central characteristic of the deposit accounts included in the data is that they should not 
have any withdrawal constraints. This means, that the depositor is able to withdraw his or her 
deposits quickly and with no cost at any point in time. In many cases, DDAs can also have 
bank card contracts attached to them, allowing the depositor to charge the account without 
ever actually withdrawing the money. Keeping these desired characteristics of demand 
deposits in mind, there is mainly one class of deposits left out from this analysis, which are 
term deposits. According to a term deposit contract, the depositor agrees to keep the deposit 
in the account for a predetermined time. Some contracts may allow an early withdrawal, but 
there is usually a significant fee charged in that case. In return for these withdrawal 
constraints, term deposits receive higher interest rates than DDAs. 
Two variables were constructed based on the deposit balance data, namely DMEUR and 
MFIDMEUR. The former is the DDA balance in the case bank, whereas the latter is the 
aggregate balance in all Finnish banks. The observations in both these variables are expressed 
in millions of euros. Because the case bank’s share of the total DDAs in the sector is fairly 
small (the mean between January 2006 and December 2010 being 0.83 %), it is reasonable to 
compare their relative developments during the sample period. Figure 4 shows the historical 
development of DMEUR and MFIDMEUR so that their indexed levels are presented. For 
both variables, the balance level of January 2006 is defined as 100. These relative balances 
are denoted as IDMEUR and IMFIDMEUR, I standing for indexed. 
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Figure 4: Relative historical development of deposit balance variables 
This figure presents the relative historical development of the two deposit balance variables used in this thesis. 
These variables are the aggregate demand deposit balances (i) in the case bank (DMEUR) and (ii) in all Finnish 
banks (MFIDMEUR). Their relative development is presented by their indexed levels, IDMEUR and 
IMFIDMEUR, where I stands for indexed. The first observation (January 2006) is used as a base observation, 
thus assigned a value of 100. Date (month/year) is presented in the X-axis and the indexed deposit balance levels 
on the two Y-axes. 
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
 700
 800
 900
 2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011
 95
 100
 105
 110
 115
 120
 125
 130
 135
 140
IDMEUR  (left)
IMFIDMEUR  (right)
 
 
4.3. Macroeconomic Risk and Market Concentration 
There are three types of macroeconomic data used in this thesis. These are data on (i) 
unemployment rate, (ii) economic output, and (iii) consumer prices. The unemployment rate 
takes into account Finnish citizens in the age group of 15-74 and is defined as the proportion 
of unemployed job applicants to the whole population. This data was obtained from Bank of 
Finland’s database. An index that measures the cycles in output levels is used to describe the 
overall economic condition in Finland. This can also be viewed as a proxy for population’s 
income, and the advantage of the output cycle index over data on income levels is that there is 
monthly data available on the output cycle index, whereas the income data is provided on a 
quarterly basis. The data for economic output cycle index was obtained from the database of 
Statistics Finland. Consumer prices, which can be considered to reflect inflation rate, are 
presented by the Finnish consumer price index. The index describes the price development of 
goods and services purchased by Finnish households. It is calculated so that the prices of 
different products are first weighted with their respective consumption shares and then these 
29  
weighted prices are summed. The consumer price index data was obtained from Statistics 
Finland as well. All these three aforementioned macroeconomic data series span from January 
2006 to December 2010. 
Market concentration data consists of DDA market shares of different types of Finnish 
banks.7 The market share of a given bank type is given as the amount of DDAs in banks of 
this particular type relative to all DDAs in all Finnish banks. This market share data was 
obtained from Bank of Finland and it spans from January 2006 to December 2010. This bank 
type specific DDA market share data is presented in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Deposit market shares by bank type 
This figure presents the bank type specific market shares in the Finnish demand deposit market. Market share is 
defined as the total demand deposit balance in banks of a given type divided by the total balance of demand 
deposits in all Finnish banks. CB, COOB, SB, and SFB stand for commercial banks, co-operative banks, savings 
banks, and subsidiaries of foreign banks, respectively. Date (month/year) is presented in the X-axis and market 
shares as percentages in the Y-axis. 
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Four variables are constructed based on the macroeconomic and market concentration data. 
These are the unemployment rate (UNEMP), an index describing the cycles in economic 
output (OUTPUT), consumer price index (CPI), and Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). 
                                                           
7
 These bank types are co-operative banks, savings banks, commercial banks, and subsidiaries of foreign banks. 
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Moreover, a dummy variable for low competition in the banking sector (LCD) is constructed 
as well. UNEMP, OUTPUT, and CPI are constructed simply by using their historical data as 
such, which means that UNEMP is presented in percentages, and OUTPUT and CPI in form 
of index values. The base year in the OUTPUT series is 2000 and in the CPI series 2005, i.e. 
these observations are assigned a value of 100. The construction of HHI, however, needed 
some additional calculations. It was obtained by summing the squared market shares of the 
four bank types. So, the possible range of values for the HHI spans from 2,500 to 10,000.8 
Moreover, the low competition dummy variable, LCD, obtains a value of 1 (0) if the observed 
level of HHI is greater (less) than the sample median HHI. The procedure for constructing 
HHI and, further, LCD follows the work of Kano et al. (2006). 
The historical development of the variables UNEMP, OUTPUT, CPI, and HHI is presented in 
Figure 6. As shown in the figure, the historical development of HHI has a clear upward trend. 
Therefore, roughly speaking the first half of LCD observations are assigned a value of zero, 
whereas the latter half receives a value of one. This is also shown in Figure 7. 
                                                           
8
 In the case when all the bank types have equal 25 % market shares (i.e. the market concentration is as low as 
possible) the value for HHI is given by 252 + 252 + 252 + 252 = 2,500. If, on the other hand, the situation is such 
that one bank type dominates the market and has a 100 % market share whereas the others have a share of 0 %, 
HHI is given by 02 + 02 + 02 + 1002 = 10,000. Naturally, this kind of situation would indicate the highest possible 
market concentration. 
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Figure 6: Historical development of macroeconomic and market concentration variables 
This figure presents the historical development of the macroeconomic and market concentration variables used 
in this thesis. These variables are the Finnish unemployment rate (UNEMP), an index describing the cycles in 
the economic output of Finland (OUTPUT), Finnish consumer price index (CPI), and the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index measuring the banking sector concentration in Finland (HHI). In all graphs, date (month/year) is presented 
in the X-axis. In the graph for UNEMP, the unemployment rate in percentages is presented in Y-axis, whereas 
the index values are presented in Y-axis in the graphs for OUTPUT, CPI, and HHI. The base year for the 
OUTPUT series is 2000 and for CPI series 2005. HHI series has no base year, and the possible values it can 
receive range from 2,500 to 10,000. The larger (smaller) the value of HHI is, the more (less) concentrated the 
demand deposit market is. 
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Figure 7: Historical development of low competition dummy variable 
This figure presents the historical values for the low competition dummy variable (LCD). It is constructed based 
on the values of Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) so that if the observed value for HHI is greater (less) than 
the sample median HHI, then LCD receives a value of 1 (0). Date (month/year) is presented in the X-axis and the 
LCD value in the Y-axis. 
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4.4. Summary of the Variables 
In this section, I present the summary statistics concerning all the variables used in this thesis. 
These statistics presented are the number of observations in the sample (N), mean, median, 1st 
and 9th deciles, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, standard error, skewness, and excess 
kurtosis. The last two of these measures, skewness and excess kurtosis, describe the shape of 
the variable’s probability distribution.9 The summary statistics are presented in Table 1 and 
the correlation matrix between the variables in Table 2. 
 
 
                                                           
9
 To be more precise, skewness and excess kurtosis measure the distribution’s deviation from normal 
distribution. Skewness measures the symmetry of a distribution on both sides of its mean value and excess 
kurtosis tells how “fat” the distribution’s tails are. In the case of normal distribution, both skewness and excess 
kurtosis are zero. Excess kurtosis is sometimes reported as plain kurtosis, in which case a normal distribution is 
defined to have a kurtosis value of 3. 
33  
Table 1: Variables’ summary statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics of all the variables used in this thesis, with two exceptions. Low 
competition dummy (LCD) is left out because these statistics are not applicable to dummy variables. Case bank’s 
deposit balance variable (DMEUR) is also excluded due to data confidentiality reasons. N denotes the number of 
observations in the sample, s denotes the sample standard deviation, and S.E. denotes the sample standard error 
(defined as s divided by the square root of N). 
  RTEUR01 RDT MFIRDT RSPREAD MFIRSPREAD MFIDMEUR UNEMP OUTPUT CPI HHI 
N 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Mean 2.6 1.6 1.0 0.9 1.5 57,362.2 7.5 119.8 106.4 4,293.5 
Median 2.9 1.4 0.9 1.4 2.0 54,253.7 7.7 121.0 108.0 4,254.7 
1st decile 0.4 0.6 0.3 -0.1 0.1 51,264.3 6.4 109.7 101.7 4,103.7 
9th decile 4.4 2.8 1.8 1.7 2.6 67,750.0 8.6 129.9 109.6 4,526.7 
Min 0.4 0.5 0.3 -0.2 0.1 49,281.9 5.9 105.4 99.9 4,078.2 
Max 4.8 3.5 2.1 2.1 3.0 70,274.1 9.0 131.7 111.3 4,601.6 
s 1.6 1.0 0.6 0.7 1.1 6,466.9 0.9 7.0 3.2 169.4 
S.E. 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 834.9 0.1 0.9 0.4 21.9 
Skewness -0.2 0.3 0.3 -0.4 -0.3 0.6 0.0 -0.1 -0.5 0.2 
Excess kurtosis -1.6 -1.5 -1.4 -1.5 -1.6 -1.1 -1.3 -0.9 -1.2 -1.4 
 
As can be seen from the summary statistics, all of the variables’ distributions have either 
positive or negative skewness. Also, all of these distributions have negative excess kurtosis, 
i.e. a kurtosis of less than 3, indicating that all of them have fat tails. A graphic representation 
of these distributions is given in Appendix 1. 
 
Table 2: Correlations between variables 
This table presents the correlation matrix between the variables used in this thesis, with two exceptions. Low 
competition dummy (LCD) is left out because it is based on an included variable, Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI). Case bank’s deposit balance variable (DMEUR) is also excluded due to data confidentiality reasons. 
These correlations are calculated based on the historical data series of these variables. 
  RTEUR01 RDT MFIRDT RSPREAD MFIDMEUR UNEMP OUTPUT CPI HHI MFIRSPREAD 
RTEUR01 1.0 
         
RDT 1.0 1.0 
        
MFIRDT 1.0 1.0 1.0 
       
RSPREAD 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.0 
      
MFIDMEUR -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.9 1.0 
     
UNEMP -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.8 0.7 1.0 
    
OUTPUT 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 -0.2 -0.6 1.0 
   
CPI -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.7 0.8 0.2 0.1 1.0 
  
HHI -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 -0.7 0.6 0.3 -0.1 0.9 1.0 
 
MFIRSPREAD 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 -0.9 -0.9 0.5 -0.6 -0.6 1.0 
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As expected, the correlations between the interest rate and spread variables are positive and 
very high, from approximately 0.8 to 1.0. Also the correlations between variables not derived 
from interest rate data and RTEUR01 are somewhat high, indicating that short-term market 
rate reflects the state of economy. 
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5. RESULTS 
In this chapter, I present the results obtained in this study thoroughly and analyze the 
implications of the main results, which consist of DDA rents and interest rate risk estimates. 
These implications are mostly discussed from the point of view of case bank’s risk 
management practices, but also in a wider context, i.e. from the viewpoint of regulators and 
the whole banking sector. Moreover, I compare my results to the findings in previous 
research. 
 
5.1. Deposit Demand Functions 
In this section, I introduce the estimated demand functions for DDAs, both from the case 
bank’s and the banking sector’s viewpoint. OLS regression is used to estimate these 
functions. Also, I will discuss the motivation of the variables included in the equations. 
An OLS regression model has several desired characteristics which should be examined when 
modeling with it. Thus, the so called diagnostic tests and their results are also presented in this 
section. First, I will present the demand function and associated diagnostic tests for the case 
bank, and after that the same results will be shown from the whole sector’s point of view. 
 
5.1.1. Case Bank 
The DDA demand function for case bank is estimated using the so called specific-to-general 
model building approach. In practice, the first step was to include only the constant term and 
RSPREAD as explanatory variables. After that, one extra variable at a time was added and the 
model with the highest adjusted R2 and coefficient t-statistics was picked. Again, new 
variables were added one by one, as long as the extra variables did not enhance the model. 
The final regression model for estimating the DDA demand function for the case bank is 
presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Case bank’s deposit demand function 
This table presents the estimated OLS regression model, which represents the deposit demand function of the 
case bank. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are used. */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1 % 
level. 
Dependent variable: DMEUR     
  Coefficient S.E. t-ratio p-value   
Constant 536.36 357.92 1.50 0.14  
RSPREAD -377.39 43.43 -8.69 0.00 *** 
UNEMP -69.94 25.58 -2.73 0.01 *** 
OUTPUT 6.47 1.99 3.25 0.00 *** 
LCD 133.85 38.70 3.46 0.00 *** 
      
R2 0.93     
Adjusted R2 0.92         
 
 
As can be seen from the model, RSPREAD, UNEMP, OUTPUT, and LCD can be considered 
as significant determinants of demand for case bank’s DDAs. All of them are significant at 
the 1 % level. However, the constant term of the model is not statistically significant, even at 
the 10 % level. The fit of the model can be considered to be quite good, since the R2 value is 
0.93. This means that the model is able to explain 93 % of the variations in the dependent 
variable, DMEUR. Also the adjusted R2, which takes into account the number of explanatory 
variables in the model, is as high as 0.92. 
As stated in Kalkbrener and Willing (2004), modeling deposit volumes as a function of 
macroeconomic environment can give important insights. Thus, it is reasonable to analyze the 
relevance of the variables used to explain the demand for DDAs. First, the motivation of 
including RSPREAD, which is a variable that takes into account the short-term market rate 
and the deposit rate, is quite straightforward, because it is built in to the general model 
(Equation (1)-(2)) used in the study. However, some additional discussion about the relevance 
of including the other macroeconomic and market concentration variables is needed. 
The Finnish unemployment rate (UNEMP) is included in the model as one explanatory 
macroeconomic variable. Jarrow and van Deventer (1998), for instance, state that even though 
they model the aggregate demand deposits as depending only on the evolution of the term 
structure of default free rates, additional randomness could be useful to include in deposit 
balance dynamics. Thus, they state that macroeconomic considerations, such as 
unemployment rate, could provide additional improvement to the model. The results of 
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Carmona (2007) indicate that the deposit balance dynamics reflect business cycle conditions 
and unemployment can be viewed to reflect the state of economy. Also, Carmona states that 
unemployment affects deposit balances because the unemployed are in need for short-term 
funding and they try to compensate their loss of income by using their assets to smooth out 
consumption. Finally, Hays et al. (2009) relate unemployment rate to the bank’s yield on 
assets and, on the other hand, cost of funds. Like Carmona, also Hays et al. view the 
unemployment rate as a proxy for economic conditions. However, empirically they do not 
find significant relationship between yield on assets and the unemployment rate or between 
the cost of funds and the unemployment rate. 
As mentioned earlier in the data section, OUTPUT is used as a proxy for the level of domestic 
income. There are a number of previous papers that relate some measure of income to the 
demand for deposits. First, Dickson and Starleaf (1972) include a measure of real income, 
gross national product (GNP), in their demand function for currency plus demand deposits 
(M1). They find that both the current value of GNP and four of its previous values are 
significant determinants of M1 demand. Goldberg and Rai (1996) use a slightly different 
measure for income level, the per capita income (PCI). According to them, the PCI of a 
country affects numerous factors related to the supply and demand for both loans and 
deposits. 
Finally, the logic behind using LCD to measure market concentration is similar as in Kano et 
al. (2006). They first construct the HHI by bank type, and then define two dummy variables 
based on that data, namely intense competition dummy (ICD) and, as also done in this thesis, 
low competition dummy (LCD). The former takes a value of one when the HHI value is less 
than its median, whereas the latter takes a value of one in case of HHI being greater than its 
median. However, as opposed to Kano et al. who relate bank competition to the benefits of 
bank-borrower relationships, this thesis relates it to the demand for DDAs. Hays et al. (2009), 
on the other hand, present an approach that is closer to the one used here, as they examine the 
impact of HHI to the yield on assets and cost of funds for commercial banks. As deposits are 
the primary source of bank funding, this approach can be viewed as somewhat similar to 
mine. 
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5.1.1.1. Diagnostic Tests 
OLS regression models have a number of desirable properties that should not be violated in 
order to validly conduct the hypothesis tests regarding the coefficient estimates. Thus, 
diagnostic tests should be carried out when building OLS regression models. There are seven 
model assumptions, presented in Brooks (2008, Chapter 4) that need to be tested using 
diagnostic tests. The assumptions are that (i) the expected value of the error term equals zero, 
(ii) the error terms are homoscedastic, (iii) the error terms are not autocorrelated, (iv) the 
explanatory variables are non-stochastic, (v) the error terms are normally distributed, (vi) 
linear function form is appropriate, and (vii) the model does not suffer from multicollinearity, 
which means that the correlations between explanatory variables are small. The results of all 
these tests for the case bank’s DDA demand function are presented next. 
First, no formal test is needed to estimate the expected value of the error term, because if a 
constant term is included in the regression equation, the expected value of the error term is 
always zero. Hence, the first assumption of the linear model is not violated. 
The second assumption of error term homoscedasticity can be formally tested. 
Homoscedasticity means that the regression error term has a constant variance through time. 
If the variance varies in time, the error term is said to be heteroscedastic. One can find 
evidence about the possible heteroscedasticity by just studying the residual plots of the 
regression model, but there are also several statistical tests for that purpose. White’s general 
test for heteroscedasticity is used in this thesis and the results concerning the case bank’s 
DDA demand function are presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4: White’s test for case bank’s deposit demand function 
This table presents the results for White’s test for error term heteroscedasticity concerning the OLS regression 
model that determines the case bank’s deposit demand function. The test is carried out for the variables’ squares 
only, i.e. cross-product terms are excluded. The null hypothesis of the test is that error term is homoscedastic. 
The TR2 test statistic, which follows a χ2 distribution, and its associated p-value are also given in the bottom of 
the table. */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1 % level. 
Dependent variable: û2     
  Coefficient S.E. t-ratio p-value   
Constant 74,215.50 345,885.00 0.21 0.83  
UNEMP 60,486.10 33,854.10 1.79 0.08 * 
OUTPUT -5,169.42 5,661.54 -0.91 0.37  
RSPREAD -4,448.91 9,290.44 -0.48 0.63  
LCD 6,959.63 4,657.91 1.49 0.14  
UNEMP2 -4,256.27 2,361.38 -1.80 0.08 * 
OUTPUT2 23.58 23.75 0.99 0.33  
RSPREAD2 1,119.07 4,575.00 0.24 0.81  
      
R2 0.27     
      
TR2 16.13     
p-value 0.02         
 
 
As can be seen from the table, the test is conducted by running an auxiliary regression in 
which the square of the original model’s residual is the dependent variable and the squares of 
the original explanatory variables are added as new regressors. The test statistic obtained from 
the regression, TR2, and its p-value indicate that the null hypothesis of no heteroscedaticity 
should be rejected, because there is only a 2 % chance of obtaining a TR2 statistic of 16.13 
when the null hypothesis actually holds. Because of this observed heteroscedasticity, the so 
called robust, or heteroscedasticity consistent, standard errors are used in the case bank’s 
DDA demand function presented earlier in Table 3. These robust standard errors are larger 
than the original ones, thus decreasing the t-ratios of coefficients and making interpretation of 
the regression results more conservative. 
The third of the desired characteristics of a linear regression model is that the error term is not 
correlated with its previous values. In case of error term correlation, it is said to be serially 
correlated or autocorrelated. Similarly as in the case of heteroscedasticity, signs of 
autocorrelation can also be found by studying the residual plots of the model. In addition, the 
presence of autocorrelation is shown in the residual autocorrelation function and partial 
autocorrelation function. The former of these shows the correlation coefficients between the 
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current observation and its previous lags, whereas the latter measures the correlation between 
observation n periods ago and the current observation, after controlling for observations at 
intermediate lags. For instance, the partial autocorrelation function for lag 2 would measure 
the correlation between yt (current observation) and yt-2, after removing the effect of yt-1. Both 
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation for the residual of case bank’s DDA demand 
function are presented graphically in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Residual autocorrelation function and partial autocorrelation function for case bank’s deposit 
demand function 
This figure presents the autocorrelation function (ACF) and partial autocorrelation function (PACF) for the OLS 
regression model that determines the deposit demand function for the case bank. The blue lines represent the 5 % 
(two-sided) rejection bands for the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. 
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In addition to graphical evidence of autocorrelation, there exist also several formal statistical 
tests for the purpose of identifying autocorrelated error term and the Breusch-Godfrey test is 
used in this thesis. The test is carried out by running an auxiliary regression in which the 
original residual of the model is used as a dependent variable and n of its lags are added as 
regressors to the right hand side of equation. According to a widely used approach with 
monthly data, 12 lags of residuals are used in the test. Results from Breusch-Godfrey test for 
the case bank’s DDA demand function are presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Breusch-Godfrey test for case bank’s deposit demand function 
This table presents the results from Breusch-Godfrey test for error term autocorrelation in the OLS regression 
model that determines the case bank’s deposit demand function. Under the null hypothesis, the current residual is 
not related to any of its 12 previous values. Three alternative test statistics and their associated p-values are 
presented in the bottom of the table: (i) LMF that follows an F-distribution, (ii) TR2 that follows a χ2 distribution, 
and (iii) Ljung-Box Q* that also follows a χ2 distribution. */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1 % level. 
Dependent variable: û     
  Coefficient S.E. t-ratio p-value   
Constant -124.27 463.64 -0.27 0.79  
UNEMP 20.45 30.94 0.66 0.51  
OUTPUT -0.73 2.22 -0.33 0.74  
RSPREAD 44.26 52.23 0.85 0.40  
LCD 35.79 52.51 0.68 0.50  
ût-1 0.47 0.17 2.83 0.01 *** 
ût-2 -0.11 0.17 -0.64 0.53  
ût-3 0.37 0.17 2.25 0.03 ** 
ût-4 -0.18 0.19 -0.91 0.37  
ût-5 0.16 0.18 0.90 0.37  
ût-6 0.00 0.20 -0.01 0.99  
ût-7 0.09 0.18 0.47 0.64  
ût-8 0.05 0.19 0.26 0.80  
ût-9 -0.23 0.20 -1.16 0.25  
ût-10 0.08 0.17 0.46 0.65  
ût-11 -0.22 0.17 -1.27 0.21  
ût-12 0.00 0.19 0.02 0.99  
      
R2 0.31     
      
LMF 1.59     
p-value 0.13     
      
TR2 18.47     
p-value 0.10     
      
Ljung-Box Q* 19.50     
p-value 0.08         
 
 
As can be seen from the table, three alternative test statistics are given. All of these have a 
null hypothesis that the error term is not autocorrelated, but the distributions these test 
statistics follow differ. The LMF test statistic follows an F-distribution, whereas TR2 and 
Ljung-Box Q* follow a χ2 distribution. The conclusion whether the model suffers from 
autocorrelation or not is a bit ambiguous here. With 90 % confidence, the LMF and TR2 
indicate that there is no significant evidence of autocorrelation, whereas the Ljung-Box Q* 
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indicates otherwise. However, since the majority of evidence suggests that there is no 
significant error term autocorrelation involved in the model, it is the conclusion made here. 
The fourth assumption is that the explanatory variables are non-stochastic, because otherwise 
the OLS estimator will not yield reliable results. However, there is an exception; it turns out 
that the OLS estimator is reliable, i.e. consistent and unbiased, even in the presence of 
stochastic regressors, if the regressors are not correlated with the model’s error term. If one or 
more of the regressors are contemporaneously correlated with the error term, the OLS 
estimator will not even be consistent. In practice, the interest in testing the fourth assumption 
is in the correlation matrix between the model residual and the explanatory variables. For the 
DDA demand function of case bank, this is given in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Correlations between the residual and explanatory variables in case bank’s deposit demand 
function 
This table presents the correlation matrix between the residual and explanatory variables in the OLS regression 
model that determines the case bank’s deposit demand function. The residual is denoted by û. 
  û UNEMP OUTPUT RSPREAD LCD 
û 1.0 
UNEMP 0.0 1.0 
OUTPUT 0.0 -0.6 1.0 
RSPREAD 0.0 -0.8 0.4 1.0 
LCD 0.0 0.5 -0.2 -0.8 1.0 
 
 
As desired, there is no evidence of correlation between the model residual and the explanatory 
variables. Thus, it can be concluded that no problems arise with the fourth assumption of 
linear regression model. 
The fifth assumption that should not be violated is that the model’s error term is normally 
distributed. Signs of non-normality can be found from the frequency distribution of the 
residual or from its skewness and kurtosis values. Also in this case, there are some formal 
tests for detection of non-normal error term. Two different tests are used in this thesis, which 
are the Jarque-Bera test and Doornik-Hansen test. The idea in the former is to test whether the 
coefficient of skewness and the coefficient of excess kurtosis are jointly zero. The test statistic 
follows a χ2 distribution under the null hypothesis that the distribution is normal. Also the 
43  
Doornik-Hansen test statistic follows a χ2 distribution and the null hypothesis is the same as 
well. The basis of the two tests is similar as they both take into account the distribution’s 
skewness and kurtosis, but the Doornik-Hansen test performs better with small sample sizes. 
Hence, it is reasonable to study the results of both tests without jumping into conclusions. The 
probability distribution of the residual in the case bank’s DDA demand function is presented 
in Figure 9. Also, it is compared to a normal distribution and the Doornik-Hansen test statistic 
is given as well. 
 
Figure 9: Probability distribution for the residual of case bank’s deposit demand function 
This figure presents the probability distribution for the residual of the OLS regression model that determines the 
deposit demand function for the case bank. Also, the figure shows a normal distribution with an appropriate 
mean and variance (solid line). Doornik-Hansen test statistic for normality and its p-value are presented in the 
upper left corner of the figure. 
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As can be seen from the figure, the residual’s distribution is somewhat close to normal. The 
Doornik-Hansen test statistic is approximately 1.91 with a p-value of 0.39 and the Jarque-
Bera test statistic (not presented in the figure) equals 0.36 with a p-value of 0.84. According 
to these criteria, strong evidence for error term normality is obtained. Thus, the conclusion is 
that the fifth assumption of linear regression model is not violated in the case bank’s DDA 
demand function. 
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The last two issues that need to be studied in OLS models are the appropriateness of the 
model’s functional form and multicollinearity, which is the mutual correlation between 
explanatory variables. The former can be tested by using a RESET test, which is a general test 
for misspecification of functional form. Naturally, the functional form of an OLS regression 
model is linear. The test is carried out by running an auxiliary regression, where the 
dependent variable is same as in the original model. The explanatory variables, however, 
differ. In the auxiliary regression, the regressors are the powers of the dependent variable’s 
fitted values together with the original explanatory variables. The results from the RESET test 
indicate that the linear function form of the case bank’s DDA demand function is appropriate. 
The test statistic, which follows an F-distribution, obtains a value of 0.04 with a p-value of 
0.84. Thus, strong evidence for appropriateness of linearity is presented. 
Finally, the presence of multicollinearity can be found by calculating the so called variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) for the model’s explanatory variables. VIF is defined as 1 / (1-√ρ), 
where ρ is the correlation coefficient between a given variable and the other explanatory 
variables in the model. The smallest possible value of VIF equals 1, whereas values in excess 
of 10 may indicate a multicollinearity problem.10 The VIFs obtained for UNEMP, OUTPUT, 
RSPREAD, and LCD equal 3.84, 1.46, 7.65, and 3.80, respectively. Hence, no evidence of 
multicollinearity is found. 
 
5.1.2. Finnish Banking Sector 
The DDA demand function for the Finnish banking sector is also estimated using linear 
regression and specific-to-general model building approach. Practically, the approach is 
similar to the one used with the case bank. The final regression model for estimating the DDA 
demand function for the banking sector is presented in Table 7. 
 
                                                           
10
 However, the interpretation of VIF values is somewhat ambiguous. As stated in O’Brien (2007), there are 
several rules of thumb regarding the threshold values of VIF that appear in both scholarly articles and statistical 
text books. The rule of 10 is the most commonly used practice for identifying multicollinearity from VIF and, 
thus, it is used in this thesis as well. Other threshold values suggested previously are, e.g., 5 and 20. 
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Table 7: Banking sector’s deposit demand function 
This table presents the estimated OLS regression model, which represents the deposit demand function of the 
Finnish banking sector. */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1 % level. 
Dependent variable: MFIDMEUR     
  Coefficient S.E. t-ratio p-value   
Constant -41,518.40 12,824.00 -3.24 0.00 *** 
MFIRSPREAD -5,689.55 392.72 -14.49 0.00 *** 
OUTPUT 202.84 44.15 4.60 0.00 *** 
CPI 796.00 139.56 5.70 0.00 *** 
LCD -2,595.44 1,027.89 -2.53 0.01 ** 
      
R2 0.93     
Adjusted R2 0.93         
 
 
As shown in the table, MFIRSPREAD, OUTPUT, CPI, and LCD constitute the set of 
significant explanatory variables in the case of the whole banking sector’s DDA demand 
function. All of them are significant at the 1 % level, except LCD, which is significant at the 5 
% level. Again, the fit of the model can be considered to be quite good, since the R2 value is 
0.93. Also the adjusted R2 is high, approximately 0.93 as well. 
With one exception, the explanatory variables are the same in this model as they were in the 
case bank’s model. Instead of UNEMP, the DDA demand function for the banking sector 
includes the consumer price index, CPI, as one of the regressors. As stated in the data chapter, 
CPI can be used as a proxy for inflation rate. This is done, e.g., by Virolainen (2004), who 
studies the explanatory power of inflation rate in determining the amount of corporate 
defaults. Moreover, the approach by Dickson and Starleaf (1972) is quite similar to mine, as 
they use “aggregate price index” as one of their explanatory variables in determining the 
demand for M1. They measure the aggregate prices by the GNP deflator, which incorporates 
all of the final goods produced by an economy, whereas the consumer price index is 
constructed based on upon a basket of goods and services. Dickson and Starleaf find that 
aggregate price index, along with three of its previous lags, is a significant determinant of M1 
demand. 
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5.1.2.1. Diagnostic Tests 
Next, the results of diagnostic tests for the banking sector’s DDA demand function are 
presented. The model assumptions and tests carried out for the model are similar as in the 
case of case bank’s DDA demand function. Again, the first assumption that the error term has 
an expected value of zero is not violated, because a constant term is included in the regression 
equation. However, the second assumption of error term homoscedasticity needs to be tested. 
Again, White’s test for heteroscedasticity is used, and the results concerning the banking 
sector’s DDA demand function are presented in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: White’s test for banking sector’s deposit demand function 
This table presents the results for White’s test for error term heteroscedasticity concerning the OLS regression 
model that determines the Finnish banking sector’s deposit demand function. The test is carried out for the 
variables’ squares only, i.e. cross-product terms are excluded. The null hypothesis of the test is that the error 
term is homoscedastic. The TR2 test statistic, which follows a χ2 distribution, and its associated p-value are also 
given in the bottom of the table. */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1 % level. 
Dependent variable: û2     
  Coefficient S.E. t-ratio p-value   
Constant -1.56E+08 6.80E+08 -0.23 0.82  
MFIRSPREAD 4.36E+06 2.34E+06 1.86 0.07 * 
OUTPUT 1.44E+06 1.82E+06 0.79 0.43  
CPI 754,916.00 1.31E+07 0.06 0.95  
LCD -2.24E+06 1.76E+06 -1.27 0.21  
MFIRSPREAD2 -1.59E+06 889,321.00 -1.79 0.08 * 
OUTPUT2 -6,209.88 7,669.12 -0.81 0.42  
CPI2 -453.95 61,934.30 -0.01 0.99  
      
R2 0.19     
      
TR2 11.18     
p-value 0.13         
 
 
As shown in the table, the test statistic obtained from the regression, TR2, and its p-value 
indicate that the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity should not be rejected. Thus, the 
conclusion here is that the model does not suffer from heteroscedasticity, and the second 
assumption of the linear regression model is not violated. 
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Third of the desired characteristics of a linear regression model is that there is no 
autocorrelation in the model’s error term. To test for this property, the residual autocorrelation 
function and partial autocorrelation function concerning the sector’s DDA demand function 
are presented in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10: Residual autocorrelation function and partial autocorrelation function for banking sector’s 
deposit demand function 
This figure presents the autocorrelation function (ACF) and partial autocorrelation function (PACF) for the OLS 
regression model that determines the deposit demand function for the Finnish banking sector. The blue lines 
represent the 5 % (two-sided) rejection bands for the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. 
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As can be seen from the figure, there are some potential evidence of autocorrelation, 
especially at lags 1 and 3. However, to accurately conclude whether the autocorrelation is 
present in the model or not, a formal test for autocorrelation has to be carried out. Similarly as 
was done with the case bank’s DDA demand function, the Breusch-Godfrey test is used here 
as well. Again, 12 lags are used in the test. Results from Breusch-Godfrey test for the banking 
sector’s DDA demand function are presented in Table 9. 
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Table 9: Breusch-Godfrey test for banking sector’s deposit demand function 
This table presents the results from Breusch-Godfrey test for error term autocorrelation in the OLS regression 
model that determines the Finnish banking sector’s deposit demand function. Under the null hypothesis, the 
current residual is not related to any of its 12 previous values. Three alternative test statistics and their associated 
p-values are presented in the bottom of the table: (i) LMF that follows an F-distribution, (ii) TR2 that follows a χ2 
distribution, and (iii) Ljung-Box Q* that also follows a χ2 distribution. */**/*** denotes significance at the 
10/5/1 % level. 
Dependent variable: û     
  Coefficient S.E. t-ratio p-value   
Constant 29,359.00 12,085.70 2.43 0.02 ** 
MFIRSPREAD 411.27 407.88 1.01 0.32  
OUTPUT -24.31 41.03 -0.59 0.56  
CPI -266.30 123.74 -2.15 0.04 ** 
LCD 2,661.76 960.19 2.77 0.01 *** 
ût-1 0.32 0.14 2.26 0.03 ** 
ût-2 0.00 0.14 -0.01 0.99  
ût-3 0.53 0.14 3.69 0.00 *** 
ût-4 0.02 0.15 0.11 0.91  
ût-5 0.24 0.16 1.51 0.14  
ût-6 0.18 0.16 1.12 0.27  
ût-7 0.07 0.16 0.40 0.69  
ût-8 0.07 0.17 0.43 0.67  
ût-9 -0.08 0.18 -0.43 0.67  
ût-10 -0.19 0.16 -1.22 0.23  
ût-11 -0.28 0.16 -1.73 0.09 * 
ût-12 0.13 0.17 0.74 0.46  
      
R2 0.55     
      
LMF 4.41     
p-value 0.00     
      
TR2 33.09     
p-value 0.00     
      
Ljung-Box Q* 47.29     
p-value 0.00         
 
 
Again, three alternative test statistics are given; LMF, TR2, and Ljung-Box Q*. The 
conclusion here is straightforward – since all the test statistics have p-values very close to 
zero, the model suffers from residual autocorrelation. This could be “cured” by, for example, 
including lagged values of the dependent variable as explanatory variables in the model. 
However, this can be problematic too, because the model can become too hard to interpret. 
Also, the inclusion of lagged values of the dependent variable as regressors violates the fourth 
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assumption that explanatory variables are non-stochastic, because the dependent variable by 
definition is partly determined by the random error term, causing its lagged values to be 
stochastic to a certain extent. Hence, because the “cure” to autocorrelation can actually lead to 
additional problems, the autocorrelation of the model is ignored here. 
The fourth assumption is that the explanatory variables are non-stochastic. However, if the 
regressors are not correlated with the residual, this question becomes irrelevant. In that case 
the OLS estimator is consistent and unbiased even in the presence of stochastic regressors. 
This issue can be studied by constructing a correlation matrix between the residual and the 
regressors, which is presented for the banking sector’s DDA demand function in Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Correlations between the residual and explanatory variables in banking sector’s deposit 
demand function 
This table presents the correlation matrix between the residual and explanatory variables in the OLS regression 
model that determines the Finnish banking sector’s deposit demand function. û denotes the residual. 
  û MFIRSPREAD OUTPUT CPI LCD 
û 1.0 
MFIRSPREAD 0.0 1.0 
OUTPUT 0.0 0.5 1.0 
CPI 0.0 -0.6 0.1 1.0 
LCD 0.0 -0.8 -0.2 0.8 1.0 
 
 
Again, there is no evidence of correlation between the model residual and the explanatory 
variables. Thus, it can be concluded that the fourth assumption of linear regression model is 
not violated. 
The fifth assumption that should not be violated is that the model’s error term is normally 
distributed. As stated earlier in the context of case bank, signs of non-normality can be found 
from the frequency distribution of the residual or from its skewness and kurtosis values, but 
there are also formal tests for that purpose. Again, the Jarque-Bera and Doornik-Hansen tests 
are used. The probability distribution of the residual in the banking sector’s DDA demand 
function is presented in Figure 11. Also, it is compared to a normal distribution and the 
Doornik-Hansen test statistic is given too. 
50  
Figure 11: Probability distribution for the residual of banking sector’s deposit demand function 
This figure presents the probability distribution for the residual of the OLS regression model that determines the 
deposit demand function for the Finnish banking sector. Also, the figure shows a normal distribution with an 
appropriate mean and variance (solid line). Doornik-Hansen test statistic for normality and its p-value are 
presented in the upper left corner of the figure. 
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As can be seen from the figure, the residual’s distribution is quite close to normal. The 
Doornik-Hansen test statistic is approximately 1.46 with a p-value of 0.48 and the Jarque-
Bera test statistic (not presented in the figure) equals 1.67 with a p-value of 0.43. Again, 
according to these criteria, strong evidence for residual normality is obtained. Thus, the 
conclusion is that the fifth assumption of linear regression model is not violated in the sector’s 
DDA demand function. 
The last two issues that need to be studied in OLS models were the appropriateness of the 
linear function form and multicollinearity. Again, the former is tested by using a RESET test 
and the latter by calculating the VIF values for the regressors. The results from the RESET 
test indicate that the linear function form of the sector’s DDA demand function may not be 
appropriate. The test statistic, which follows an F-distribution, obtains a value of 29.33 with a 
p-value quite close to zero. Thus, some other functional form could perform better than linear, 
but since the vast majority of the linear model assumptions are not violated, the results from 
the RESET test are set aside here. Finally, no evidence of multicollinearity was found. The 
obtained VIF values for OUTPUT, CPI, LCD, and MFIRSPREAD are equal to 1.90, 3.95, 
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5.38, and 3.50, respectively. Because all of these are less than 10, it can be concluded that the 
correlations between explanatory variables do not constitute a problem. 
 
5.2. AR(2) Models 
A majority of the variables in this thesis are modeled as autoregressive ARIMA(2,1,0) 
processes due to the observed lag structure and non-stationarity of data series used. As stated 
earlier in the methodology chapter, an ARIMA(2,1,0) model is equivalent to an AR(2) model 
for a series that is differenced once. The variables for which this model is applied are 
DMEUR, MFIDMEUR, UNEMP, OUTPUT, CPI, and HHI. The estimated AR(2) models for 
the differenced series of these variables are given in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: Autoregressive models for deposit balance, macroeconomic, and market concentration variables 
This table presents the estimated AR(2) models for the deposit balance, macroeconomic, and market 
concentration variables. Deposit balance variables include the case bank’s demand deposit balance (DMEUR) 
and the aggregate demand deposit balance within the Finnish banking sector (MFIDMEUR). Macroeconomic 
variables include the Finnish unemployment rate (UNEMP), an index describing the cycles in economic output 
of Finland (OUTPUT), and the Finnish consumer price index (CPI). The variable measuring banking market 
concentration in Finland is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). The models are constructed based on the 
series that are differenced once, causing the estimated models to be equivalent with ARIMA(2,1,0) models using 
the original data. The estimated coefficients and their respective z-statistics (in parentheses) are given. */**/*** 
denotes significance at the 10/5/1 % level. 
    
Dependent variable µ Φ1 Φ2 
DMEUR 14.29 0.34 0.10 
 (4.97) *** (2.62) *** (0.71) 
MFIDMEUR 337.74 -0.41 -0.09 
 (3.72) *** (-3.12) *** (-0.73) 
UNEMP 0.00 0.44 0.01 
 (0.04) (3.34) *** (0.08) 
OUTPUT 0.29 -0.55 -0.41 
 (0.76) (-4.56) *** (-3.37) *** 
CPI 0.20 0.14 0.14 
 (3.09) *** (1.08) (1.09) 
HHI 5.63 -0.01 -0.02 
  (0.88) (-0.12) (-0.14) 
 
 
.2211 tttt uyyy +++= −− φφµ
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The next step required in the analysis was to produce 40-year forecasts based on these AR(2) 
models. Autoregressive models suit well for forecasting purposes, but challenges arise with 
the unexpected movements of macroeconomic variables. Because of this, the forecasts 
produced here are based solely on historical data and it is assumed that the future 
development of variables can be derived from their historical fluctuations. The forecasted 
series based on the AR(2) models are given in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12: Forecasts for deposit balance, macroeconomic, and market concentration variables 
This figure presents the autoregressive forecasts for the deposit balance, macroeconomic, and market 
concentration variables. The only deposit balance variable presented here is the aggregate demand deposit 
balance within the Finnish banking sector (MFIDMEUR). Macroeconomic variables included are the Finnish 
unemployment rate (UNEMP), an index describing the cycles in economic output of Finland (OUTPUT), and 
the Finnish consumer price index (CPI). The variable measuring banking market concentration in Finland is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). The forecast for case bank’s deposit balance variable (DMEUR) is excluded 
due to data confidentiality reasons. These forecasts are based on the estimated AR(2) models for the variables’ 
differenced series. The historical development of a variable is presented by the red line, the forecast by the blue 
line, and 95 % confidence intervals by the green lines. Date (month/year) is presented in the X-axis and the 
observed/forecasted value of the variable in the Y-axis. 
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As can be seen from the figure, the majority of these forecasts have very wide 95 % 
confidence intervals. In other words, the forecasts contain quite a lot uncertainty, which can 
be expected when forecasting the future development of macroeconomic variables. 
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5.3. Cox-Ingersoll-Ross Model 
In this section, I present the estimated Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model for the short-term market 
interest rate. As stated earlier, the short-term market rate is the only source of risk in the 
model, and hence it has to be modeled as a stochastic process. RTEUR01 is the variable used 
as the short-term market rate and a Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model is applied to describe its 
dynamics. Recall that the model was defined as follows in Equation (9): 
,)( 111 ttttt ztrtrrr ∆+∆−+= −−− σθκ   
where r is the short-term interest rate, κ(θ-rt-1) is the drift factor that ensures the mean 
reversion of the process towards its long-term mean θ, σ is the volatility of the interest rate 
changes that is conditional on the square root of the variable’s preceding value, and zt is a 
normally distributed and stochastic Wiener process. 
By regressing RTEUR01 on its one period lagged value, the parameter estimates were 
obtained. The longest possible period for Helibor/Euribor data was used in order to get as 
reliable parameter estimates as possible. This data spans from January 1987 to December 
2010. After running the regression, the following model was obtained: 
.08.0)99.2(01.0 111 ttttt ztrtrrr ∆+∆−+= −−−  (11) 
It can be inferred from the model that the speed of mean reversion, κ, equals 0.01, the long-
term mean level, θ, equals 2.99 %, and the volatility of monthly interest rate changes, σ, 
equals 0.08 (8 %). Keeping in mind that monthly data is used in all phases, i.e. ∆t = 1, and σ is 
expressed in monthly terms, the model can be simplified as follows: 
.08.099.00299.0 11 tttt zrrr −− ++=  (12) 
After the model has been estimated, it is used for Monte Carlo simulation purposes. The 
fluctuating nature of the simulated paths comes from zt, which is a random process. Figure 13 
presents simulated 40-year paths for RTEUR01 under three different scenarios. First, the path 
where no interest rate shock is assumed to take place is given. Also, the paths assuming +100 
and +200 bps shocks in the first simulated observation are presented. Since these shocks 
occur only in the first observation, they disappear gradually as the process moves on. The 
starting level of the interest rate process, r0, is the observation of December 2010 (0.81 %) in 
each of the three cases. 
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Figure 13: Three simulated paths for the short-term market interest rate 
This figure presents three different simulated paths that estimate the future fluctuations in the short-term market 
rate, i.e. one month Euribor rate (RTEUR01). The black line represents the simulated path with no artificially 
generated shocks. The blue (green) line, on the other hand, represents the estimated path when a +100 (+200) 
bps shock is assumed to occur in the first simulated observation. The model that the processes are assumed to 
follow is a Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model and the presented paths come from three independent simulation trials. 
The starting level of the processes is the observation of December 2010 and observations prior to that are 
historical quotes. Date (month/year) is presented in the X-axis and the interest rate in percentages in Y-axis. 
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As can be seen from the figure, the shocked paths “jump” upwards in the first observation, but 
in the future the effect of the shock vanishes. Also, the model’s mean-reverting condition is 
well visible in the figure as the processes tend to revert towards the long-term mean, 2.99 %. 
 
5.4. DDA Rate and Rent Dynamics 
In this section, the results concerning the dynamics of the optimal DDA rate and monthly 
rents are presented from both the case bank’s and the whole sector’s point of view. Even 
though the magnitude of deposit rents depends on the assumed future development of deposit 
balances, the dynamics of these monthly rent estimates and optimal deposit rates are similar 
regardless of the nominal amount of deposits in a bank’s balance sheet. Hence, the optimal 
DDA rate and rent dynamics are presented here assuming that deposit balances remain 
constant over time. 
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As presented in Equation (4), the optimal spread between the short-term market rate and the 
DDA rate is given by the following formula: 
)),(//()())()(( * dd rrDDtctrtr −∂∂−−=−   
where the left-hand side of the equation represents the optimal spread, c(t) is the noninterest 
cost of accepting demand deposits (assumed to be equal to zero), D is the quantity of DDAs 
demanded by depositors, and ∂D / ∂(r - rd) is the elasticity of DDA demand with respect to 
changes in the spread between the market rate and the DDA rate. After the resulting spread is 
found, the optimal DDA rate can be easily obtained by subtracting this spread from the short-
term market rate. Appendix 2 presents the estimated paths for spread elasticities of DDA 
demand and the corresponding optimal spreads from individual simulation trials for the case 
bank and the whole banking sector. The optimal DDA rate paths and the corresponding values 
for the short-term market rate from the same simulation trials are presented in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14: Simulated short-term market interest rate and the corresponding optimal deposit rate for case 
bank and banking sector 
This figure presents the simulated short-term market rates and the corresponding optimal demand deposit rates 
for both the case bank and the Finnish banking sector. RTEUR01_1 and RTEUR01_2 are two independent paths 
for the short-term market rate, and OPT_RDT and OPT_MFIRDT are the optimal demand deposit rates for the 
case bank and the sector, respectively. Two simulation trials were needed to obtain these figures: RTEUR01_1 
and OPT_RDT come from the first trial and RTEUR01_2 and OPT_MFIRDT from the second. The case bank’s 
(sector’s) optimal demand deposit rate and RTEUR01_1 (RTEUR01_2) is presented in the left (right) graph. 
Date (month/year) is presented in the X-axis and the interest rates in percentages in the Y-axis. Deposit balances 
are assumed to be constant through time. 
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As shown in the figure, the optimal DDA rate converges to the short-term market rate in both 
cases as the simulation horizon extends. This means that for both the case bank and the whole 
banking sector the optimal spread between the short-term market rate and the DDA rate 
narrows as time passes. 
This observed behavior of the optimal spread derives from the future estimates for spread 
elasticity of DDA demand (∂D / ∂(r - rd)), which is assumed to be linearly dependent on the 
estimated future levels of the variables affecting DDA demand and also relative to the amount 
of DDAs accepted. Because of the forecasted development of these variables the future values 
of spread elasticity of DDA demand are both negative and have a downward sloping trend. 
One example of the factors affecting this development is the unemployment rate in Finland, 
which is forecasted to grow in the future (see Figure 12). It is likely that increasing 
unemployment causes the consumers’ wealth to decrease, which results in lower DDA 
demand, decreasing bank market power, and, eventually, narrower optimal spreads between 
the market rate and the DDA rate. 
The next step after obtaining the optimal spread between the market rate and the DDA rate is 
to calculate the resulting deposit rents for all future dates, or as is done in this thesis, for the 
40-year simulation horizon. At time point t, this rent is calculated by multiplying the 
estimated deposit balance by the optimal spread and it can be viewed as the monthly profit for 
the bank from accepting DDAs. After the rents are calculated for all the future observations, 
their present values are calculated by discounting them by the simulated short-term market 
rate. The last phase in the valuation exercise is to sum these discounted future monthly rents 
and divide it by the initial deposit balance. Simulated paths for future rents and discounted 
rents for both the case bank and the whole banking sector are given in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15: Simulated monthly deposit rents and discounted rents for case bank and banking sector 
This figure presents the simulated future deposit rents and discounted monthly rents for both the case bank (left 
graph) and the Finnish banking sector (right graph). CB_RENT and CB_DISC_RENT (MFI_RENT and 
MFI_DISC_RENT) denote the case bank’s (sector’s) future monthly rent and discounted rent, respectively. Date 
(month/year) is presented in X-axis and the rents in millions of euros in Y-axis. Deposit balances are assumed to 
be constant through time. 
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In both cases, the future rents have a decreasing trend. Of course, this is a logical consequence 
when the optimal spread between market rate and the DDA rates narrows as time passes and 
the deposit balances remain constant at the same time. Appendix 2 presents the estimated 
paths for the discount factors used in both graphs of Figure 15. 
 
5.5. DDA Rent, Liability, and Interest Rate Risk Estimates 
In this section, I present the results concerning DDA valuation and interest rate risk 
measurement, which constitute the primary objective of this thesis. For case bank, these 
results are presented assuming different deposit balance dynamics. These dynamics are (i) 
constant deposits, (ii) decaying deposits (10-50 % p.a., with 10 % intervals), and (iii) growing 
deposits, which means that the deposits are assumed to grow according to the AR(2) forecast 
presented earlier. For the whole sector, only the case of growing deposits is covered, since the 
results under constant and decaying balances are similar to the case bank due to assumed 
similarities in the dynamics of interest rate spread elasticity. Hence, the value added by the 
calculations considering the whole sector is in the analysis on how different future growth 
rates, derived from historical data, affect the value and risk estimates of DDAs. 
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First, the results concerning DDA rents and liabilities for both the case bank and the banking 
sector are covered. As discussed earlier, the deposit liability value is defined as the nominal 
value of DDAs accepted minus the rent, i.e. L0 = D0 - P0. According to the established 
practice in the literature, rent and liability estimates are reported as percentages of initial DDA 
balance (P0/D0 and L0/D0, respectively). Moreover, the z-statistics for mean rent estimates are 
presented in order to test the H1 hypothesis that the average rents are significantly in excess of 
zero. Estimated rents and liabilities in the absence of short-term rate shocks are presented in 
Tables 12 and 13, and the rents’ frequency distributions in Figure 16. Appendix 3 presents the 
rent and liability estimates under +100 and +200 bps shocks. 
 
Table 12: Deposit rent estimates 
This table presents the demand deposit (DDA) rent estimates under different deposit balance dynamics and in the 
absence of short-term market rate shocks. Rents are reported as percentages of initial DDA balance, i.e. P0/D0, 
where P0 is the sum of discounted future monthly rents and D0 is the initial DDA balance at t = 0. Estimates are 
obtained from 1,000 Monte Carlo simulation trials. z-statistics are given in parentheses. */**/*** denotes 
significance at the 10/5/1 % level. 
 P0/D0       
 Case bank           
   Mean Median Min Max 1st decile 9th decile 
 ConstantA 19.66 % 19.63 % 16.67 % 22.48 % 18.60 % 20.70 % 
  (735.96) ***      
D
e
c
a
y
 r
a
te
 
10 % 8.10 % 8.11 % 6.26 % 10.27 % 7.40 % 8.76 % 
 (469.97) ***      
20 % 4.70 % 4.72 % 3.13 % 6.39 % 4.17 % 5.19 % 
 (368.40) ***      
30 % 3.06 % 3.07 % 2.05 % 4.03 % 2.68 % 3.44 % 
 (327.75) ***      
40 % 2.15 % 2.16 % 1.51 % 2.83 % 1.86 % 2.44 % 
 (300.42) ***      
50 % 1.55 % 1.55 % 0.99 % 2.09 % 1.30 % 1.77 % 
  (271.67) ***      
 GrowingB 61.70 % 61.69 % 53.00 % 71.06 % 58.01 % 65.29 % 
  (674.21) ***      
        
 Sector             
 GrowingB 32.90 % 32.88 % 28.27 % 39.10 % 31.10 % 34.78 % 
   (710.99) ***           
 A DDA balance is assumed to remain constant through time.   
 B DDA balance is assumed to grow according to an AR(2) forecast.   
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Table 13: Deposit liability estimates 
This table presents the demand deposit (DDA) liability estimates under different deposit balance dynamics and 
in the absence of short-term market rate shocks. Liability values (L0) are defined as the nominal value of DDAs 
minus the rent and they are reported as percentages of initial DDA balance, i.e. L0/D0. Estimates are obtained 
from 1,000 Monte Carlo simulation trials. 
 L0/D0       
 Case bank           
   Mean Median Min Max 1st decile 9th decile 
 ConstantA 80.34 % 80.37 % 77.52 % 83.33 % 79.30 % 81.40 % 
D
e
c
a
y
 r
a
te
 10 % 91.90 % 91.89 % 89.73 % 93.74 % 91.24 % 92.60 % 
20 % 95.30 % 95.28 % 93.61 % 96.87 % 94.81 % 95.83 % 
30 % 96.94 % 96.93 % 95.97 % 97.95 % 96.56 % 97.32 % 
40 % 97.85 % 97.84 % 97.17 % 98.49 % 97.56 % 98.14 % 
50 % 98.45 % 98.45 % 97.91 % 99.01 % 98.23 % 98.70 % 
 GrowingB 38.30 % 38.31 % 28.94 % 47.00 % 34.71 % 41.99 % 
        
 Sector             
 GrowingB 67.10 % 67.12 % 60.90 % 71.73 % 65.22 % 68.90 % 
 A DDA balance is assumed to remain constant through time.   
 B DDA balance is assumed to grow according to an AR(2) forecast.   
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Figure 16: Frequency distributions of deposit rents 
This figure presents the frequency distributions of demand deposit rents under different deposit balance 
dynamics and in the absence of short-term market rate shocks. Distributions are obtained from 1,000 Monte 
Carlo simulation trials. Starting from the figure in the upper left corner and moving from left to right, the figures 
show rent distributions for (i) case bank under growing deposit balances (RENTS_CB_AR2), (ii) case bank 
under constant deposit balances (RENTS_CB_CONS), (iii) case bank under deposit balances decaying 10-50 % 
p.a. (RENTS_CB_D10 - RENTS_CB_D50), and (iv) Finnish banking sector under growing deposit balances 
(RENTS_S_AR2). Rents are reported as percentages of the initial deposit balance. 
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As can be seen from both tables and rent distributions above, the assumed deposit balance 
dynamics play an important role in the valuation of DDAs. For example, the mean P0/D0 
(L0/D0) for the case bank varies between 1.55 and 8.10 % (91.90-98.45 %) under different 
annual decay rates, whereas in the case of constant deposits it is as much as 19.66 % (80.34 
%). However, the case of growing deposits is naturally even more extreme: the mean P0/D0 
(L0/D0) is 61.70 % (38.30 %) for the case bank and 32.90 % (67.10 %) for the whole banking 
sector. Hence, the forecasted growth has an important effect on the valuation of DDAs and it 
can be concluded that banks that grow faster than average are likely to enjoy relatively larger 
future rents than the banking sector as a whole. Of course, this statement holds here due to 
assumed similarities in interest rate spread elasticities of DDA demand between the rapidly 
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growing case bank and the banking sector, but if they were to differ, the conclusion could be 
different. Moreover, as the z-statistics obtained for the mean P0/D0 values indicate, it is likely 
that the obtained mean rent estimates for both the case bank and the banking sector are 
significantly greater than zero under all DDA balance dynamics studied. Hence, strong 
evidence is found to support H1. 
The results concerning the other important aspect of this thesis, DDA interest rate risk, are 
covered next. Interest rate risk is defined as the interest rate sensitivity of DDA value, i.e. the 
change in rent/liability value due to a given shock in the short-term market rate. Two shocks 
are considered, +100 and +200 bps, and the interest rate risk estimates, ∆P0/D0 and ∆L0/D0, 
are presented as percentage changes in the simulated mean values of P0/D0 and L0/D0. Also, 
the z-statistics for ∆P0/D0 under both shocks are presented in order to test the hypothesis that 
positive interest rate shocks result to an increase in mean DDA rent values (H2). The results 
for interest rate risk of DDAs are presented in Table 14. 
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Table 14: Deposit interest rate risk estimates 
This table presents the results concerning the interest rate risk estimates for demand deposits (DDAs) under 
different deposit balance dynamics. Interest rate risk is measured as percentage change in the mean value of rent 
or liability caused by either a +100 or +200 bps shock in the short-term market rate, i.e. the interest rate 
sensitivity. The shock is artificially generated only to the first simulated observation. Interest rate risk estimate 
for rent (liability) value is denoted by ∆P0/D0 (∆L0/D0). Estimates are obtained from 1,000 Monte Carlo 
simulation trials. z-statistics are in parentheses and */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1 % level. 
  +100 bps +200 bps +100 bps +200 bps 
   ∆P0/D0 ∆P0/D0 ∆L0/D0 ∆L0/D0 
 Case bank       
 ConstantA 9.35 % 19.13 % -2.22 % -4.62 % 
D
e
c
a
y
 r
a
te
 
 (40.42) *** (66.46) ***   
10 % 19.07 % 38.49 % -1.63 % -3.34 % 
 (54.13) *** (76.09) ***   
20 % 27.56 % 53.76 % -1.31 % -2.59 % 
 (59.36) *** (76.01) ***   
30 % 36.16 % 70.35 % -1.10 % -2.17 % 
 (66.47) *** (88.60) ***   
40 % 43.83 % 82.48 % -0.93 % -1.77 % 
 (71.89) *** (94.50) ***   
 50 % 52.10 % 98.37 % -0.79 % -1.50 % 
  (78.07) *** (98.43) ***   
 GrowingB 4.07 % 8.18 % -5.65 % -12.31 % 
  (18.43) *** (33.54) ***   
      
 Sector         
 GrowingB 6.28 % 12.67 % -2.93 % -6.06 % 
   (28.84) *** (50.48) ***     
 A DDA balance is assumed to remain constant through time. 
 B DDA balance is assumed to grow according to an AR(2) forecast. 
 
 
Again, the assumed DDA balance dynamics play an important role in determining the DDAs’ 
exposure to interest rate risk. For example, under constant balances and assuming a +100 bps 
shock, the value of case bank’s rents increase by 9.35 %, whereas under balances that decay 
10 % annually the change in the value of rents is 19.07 %. Naturally, the effect is reverse in 
the case of liability values, because an increase in the value of rents causes, by definition, the 
value of liabilities to decrease. Since shocks are assumed to gradually vanish, their effect on 
rent values is large with high decay rates. When the decay rate is high the future rents become 
smaller all the time as time passes, causing the value of near rents to increase relatively more 
than, e.g., in the case of constant deposit balances. 
Additionally, an interesting issue considers the difference in the effect of forecasted DDA 
balance growth on the interest rate risk estimates (Table 14) and deposit rent valuation (Table 
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12). When deposit rents are valued under growing deposits, the results indicate that more 
rapid growth results in higher deposit rents. Case bank’s growth rate is estimated to be faster 
than the sector’s aggregate growth rate, causing the P0/D0 to equal 61.70 % for the case bank 
and 32.90 % for the sector. However, positive interest rate shocks seem to be more 
advantageous in the case of slower growth, i.e. P0/D0 increases relatively more due to a shock. 
This can be seen from Table 14 so that ∆P0/D0 for a +100 bps (+200 bps) shock equals 4.07 
% (8.18 %) for case bank, and 6.28 % (12.67 %) for the whole sector. Moreover, the z-
statistics for the interest rate sensitivities of DDA rents (∆P0/D0) presented in Table 14 
suggest that H2 is supported. Hence, the conclusion is that positive market rate shocks seem to 
cause statistically significant positive changes in DDA rents. 
 
5.6. Analysis and Discussion 
The results concerning DDA valuation and their interest rate risk have many implications, 
from both the case bank’s and the whole banking sector’s viewpoint. Also, many interesting 
questions from the viewpoints of bank regulator and supervisor arise as well. 
First, the presence of DDA rents and their valuation have an impact on the case bank’s asset 
and liability management. In addition to concentrating on the nominal amount of DDAs 
accepted, i.e. the “adequacy of funding”, the bank should also take into account that the 
DDAs’ profitability depends on the spread between market rate and the DDA rate. Hence, the 
bank should set its DDA interest rate at such level that maximizes its profits from accepting 
these deposits. It is also worth noting that since the profitability of DDAs increases when the 
market rate rises, some of the value losses on the asset side may be offset by the additional 
gains from issuing deposits, thus causing the profitability of DDAs to have an influence on 
the bank’s asset side as well. 
The results on DDA valuation have implications to the case bank’s liquidity risk management 
as well. Because the valuation procedure contains some uncertainty, the bank cannot 
accurately forecast the future monthly rents. In this case, it would be reasonable to study the 
estimated rent distribution and then prepare appropriate practices to manage this uncertainty, 
e.g. with additional liquid assets. By doing so, the risk to engage in harmful asset fire sales 
decreases. Moreover, the results concerning the interest rate risk of DDAs emphasize some 
hedging policies the case bank should consider. Because the changes in market rates are likely 
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to cause changes in the value of DDAs, it could be reasonable to hedge these positions, so that 
exposure to these market rate movements decreases. Interest rate derivatives, such as swaps, 
could be used for hedging purposes. Under an interest rate swap contract the bank would 
effectively face fixed deposit rates in place of floating rates, which in turn could stabilize the 
fluctuations in the DDA rent/liability values and thus reduce the associated interest rate risk. 
Also, it should be noted that the bank’s assets will hedge the interest rate risk associated with 
DDAs if they both have similar value sensitivities with relation to a given shock in the market 
rate. 
The results have implications from the viewpoint of the Finnish banking sector as well. For 
example, the sensitivity of DDA rent estimates to changes in the market rate can be used to 
measure the system-wide riskiness of the whole sector. If the profitability of DDAs is very 
sensitive to movements in the short-term rate, it can be inferred that the system-wide interest 
rate risk in the deposit market is high. On the contrary, the banking sector can be seen as 
somewhat stable in the case on DDA insensitivity to market rate fluctuations. Also, the 
sector’s potential to make positive rents at the cost of depositors can be seen as evidence of 
banks’ market power indicating that the competition between banks is imperfect. When the 
rents increase, it is likely that the competitive environment has become less intense, and on 
the contrary, if the rents decrease, the market is likely to be more competed. This competition 
aspect is of interest for the bank regulator and supervisor as well, because abnormally large 
rents may indicate that the banks in the market exercise excessive monopoly power that is not 
favorable to the consumers. Hence, in such a case the regulator may want to set restrictions to 
the banks, for example in the form of merger regulations. 
Moreover, the valuation of DDAs presents two additional questions that are interesting from 
the regulation’s point of view. First, as the interest rate risk estimates show, banks’ profits 
from accepting DDAs vary with market rate movements. As a result of this, the banks’ 
availability of liquidity becomes more uncertain in the presence of volatile interest rates. This 
has to be taken into account by the bank regulator, who should set sufficient capital buffers 
for banks to meet. This would enhance the ability of banks to meet their liabilities that come 
due. Second, a question related to the balance sheet treatment of DDAs arises. Currently, the 
common practice is to value DDAs at their nominal values in banks’ balance sheets, whereas 
their valuation is actually affected significantly by the rents the deposits generate. Hence, the 
regulator should consider possible refinements in the treatment of DDAs in the banks’ 
balance sheets. A refinement of this kind might be to, for example, adjust the DDAs’ balance 
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sheet valuation by the rents that are likely to be generated in the upcoming few years under 
some conservative scenario, say, 50 % annual balance decay rate and some negative interest 
rate shock. This way, a more accurate estimate of the DDAs’ actual value would be obtained 
in a way that does not underestimate the interest rate risk associated with them. 
Even though the findings in previous literature are somewhat ambiguous, my results are well 
in line with some of the previous papers. There are three basic reasons why some of the 
results differ between the three main reference papers, Hutchison and Pennacchi (1996), 
O’Brien (2000), and Dewachter et al. (2006). The first one of these reasons is the fact that 
their samples consist of banks from different kinds of markets. Hutchison and Pennacchi, as 
well as O’Brien, examine U.S. banks, whereas Dewachter et al. concentrate on Belgian banks. 
Second, differences may arise from the time periods used for historical data, as the basic 
model used in all of these papers is essentially a model for stable economic environment. 
Hence, it may be problematic to use data from times of economic downturn to, for example, 
estimate the parameter dynamics used in a study. Finally, third, the methodologies used in all 
of these papers differ somehow. For example, Hutchison and Pennacchi present an analytical 
solution to valuation of rents, whereas O’Brien and Dewachter et al. use numerical methods. 
One of the main results obtained in this thesis is that the mean (median) rent under constant 
deposits is estimated to be 19.66 % (19.63 %) for the case bank, and the results of O’Brien 
(2000) indicate that the median rent under the same assumptions is 21.10 % for the U.S. 
banks’ NOW accounts (12.20 % for MMDAs). The same results, however, are somewhat 
different in the papers by Hutchison and Pennacchi (1996) and Dewachter et al. (2006). The 
former finds rents to be lower, as their results indicate a median rent of 6.55 % (7.88 %) for 
NOW accounts (MMDAs). On the other hand, the rents on Belgian banks’ savings deposit 
accounts reported by Dewachter et al. are significantly greater, as the mean rent equals 47.80 
%. 
In addition to this thesis, deposit valuation under decaying deposit balances is studied in 
Dewachter et al. (2006). Again, their estimates for Belgian banks’ deposit rents are greater 
than the ones obtained for the Finnish case bank in this thesis. They find that the average rents 
range from 7.90 % to 29.00 % depending on the decay rate assumed, whereas my results 
indicate that under similar decay rate assumptions, the range spans from 1.55 % to 8.10 %. 
However, the reason for that difference is likely to be the fact that Dewachter et al. report the 
average rents across the whole banking sector, whereas my results concerning decaying 
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balances are only for a single bank.  This is partly supported by the additional representations 
by Dewachter et al., as they show that the estimates for individual banks within their sample 
differ significantly. 
The case of growing deposits is also studied in this thesis, as it is in O’Brien (2000) as well, 
whose results are quite different for NOW accounts and MMDAs. He finds that the median 
rent for NOW accounts under growing deposit balances equals 44.70 % or 62.40 %, 
depending on the underlying model for deposit evolvement. The same results for MMDAs are 
5.00 % and 8.70 %, indicating that the differences in profitability between NOW accounts and 
MMDAs are substantial. The results obtained in this thesis are well in line with O’Brien’s 
NOW account estimates, as the mean DDA rent under growing deposit balances for the case 
bank (banking sector) equals 61.70 % (32.90 %). 
The interest rate risk estimates reported in this thesis are somewhat well in line with those 
obtained in previous literature. Assuming constant deposits and +100 bps shock in the short-
term market rate, Dewachter et al. (2006) find that the change in DDA liability value equals -
1.66 %. My results are quite well in line with that since ∆L0/D0 for constant deposits equals -
2.22 %. Concerning decaying balances, Dewachter et al. find that a +100 bps shock causes a 
liability value change between -1.38 % and -3.11 %, depending on the assumed decay rate. 
Again, my results are quite similar to those, as I find that ∆L0/D0 varies between -0.79 % and -
1.63 % for decaying deposit balances. O’Brien (2000), who reports his interest rate risk 
estimates as percentage points, finds that under +100 bps (+200 bps) shock the interest rate 
sensitivity for NOW accounts assuming constant deposit balances equals -0.87 (-0.93) 
percentage points and for MMDAs -0.45 (-0.51) percentage points. Again, the effect of 
positive interest rate shock on deposit liability values is negative. My results, reported as 
percentage points, indicate a greater DDA sensitivity to interest rate changes than the results 
of O’Brien, as I find that under constant deposit balances the average ∆L0/D0 is -1.80 (-3.72) 
percentage points for a +100 bps (+200 bps) shock. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
This thesis provided important insights and analysis about the rents that banks earn from 
accepting demand deposits (DDAs) and the interest rate risk associated with these deposits. 
Additional attention was given to the banks’ market power, since the study is carried out in an 
environment of concentrated banking sector. A fundamental assumption in previous literature 
studying deposit valuation and interest rate risk has been that deposit balances remain 
constant over time, but the analysis carried out in this thesis assumes different scenarios for 
DDA balance dynamics. A majority of previous work on deposit valuation has been carried 
out from the viewpoint of U.S. banks, whereas the focus of this thesis is to analyze DDA rents 
and interest rate risk for a single Finnish case bank, and, to some extent, the whole Finnish 
banking sector. Moreover, the research methodologies used in earlier studies differ somewhat 
and this thesis employs a methodology that is a combination of the previous ones. The general 
model of bank profit maximization is similar as in Hutchison and Pennacchi (1996), whereas 
calculating the rents and interest rate risk using Monte Carlo simulation follows the work of 
O’Brien (2000) and Dewachter et al. (2006). 
The findings in previous literature are somewhat ambiguous. For instance, under the 
assumption of constant deposit balances, Hutchison and Pennacchi (1996) find that the U.S. 
banks’ demand deposit accounts earn rents (expressed as a percentage of the deposits’ 
nominal value) of approximately 7-9 %, whereas the results of O’Brien (2000) indicate rents 
between 12 % and 21 %. Even more extreme results are reported in Dewachter et al. (2006), 
whose analysis considers Belgian banks. They find the average rent across different banks to 
be as high as 47.80 %. 
The results obtained in this thesis indicate that there are several macroeconomic and market 
concentration factors that significantly affect the public’s demand for DDAs and the 
assumptions concerning deposit balance dynamics and growth rates play an important role in 
the valuation of DDAs. In addition, it is found that the case bank and the Finnish banking 
sector as a whole exercise market power, as the DDA rents in both cases are significant. The 
magnitude of these rents is mostly consistent with the findings of O’Brien (2000), as I find 
that the mean (median) rent for the case bank assuming constant deposit balances equals 
19.66 % (19.63 %). The interest rate risk estimates obtained in this thesis are also somewhat 
well in line with previous research. For example, Dewachter et al. (2006) find that the change 
in DDA liability value due to a +100 bps shock in the short-term market rate equals -1.66 % 
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and I find that to be -2.22 %. However, the results of O’Brien are slightly different here, as I 
find that the case bank has a greater sensitivity to interest rate changes than can be inferred 
from his results. Despite the differences in the actual interest rate risk estimates, the dynamics 
of rent and liability values due to a given market rate shock are similar in both this thesis and 
previous papers. Finally, strong evidence is found to support both the hypothesis that banks 
earn positive rents (H1) and a positive interest rate shock causes the value of rents to increase 
(H2).  
In addition to academic contribution, the results obtained in this thesis have practical 
implications from the viewpoints of the case bank, Finnish banking sector, and bank 
regulator. First, in order to manage its deposit liabilities accurately, the case bank should 
recognize both of the components that affect the profitability of DDAs, which are their 
outstanding balance and the spread between the short-term market rate and the DDA rate. For 
example, raising the amount of deposits by paying out very high rates may not be an optimal 
choice, when greater profits could actually be achieved by wider spreads and lower balances. 
Also, the results have implications for the bank’s liquidity risk management as well, because 
the rents earned from DDAs can be considered as somewhat liquid assets and fluctuations in 
their magnitude can cause uncertainty with relation to the bank’s liquidity position. Finally, 
the bank should consider carefully its hedging procedures based on the interest rate risk 
estimates. The value of the rents is exposed to changes in market rates, and hence the bank 
should consider hedging this position, at least to some extent, using interest rate derivatives. 
This would also enhance the liquidity management procedures since the availability of 
liquidity would be easier to predict. 
From the viewpoint of the Finnish banking sector, the first implication of the results is that the 
interest rate sensitivity of DDA valuation can be used to measure the system-wide riskiness of 
the DDA market. Also, potential signs of bank market power can be inferred from the rents 
generated by the banks as an aggregate. If banks generate substantially large rents, the most 
likely reason for that would be the imperfect competition within the sector. This concentration 
aspect is of interest for the competition authorities as well, as they are responsible for 
maintaining the sector competitive and favorable to consumers. Hence, in the presence of 
abnormally large rents, the authorities should consider their policies with respect to, for 
example, banking sector mergers and antitrust laws. The banking regulator that is responsible 
for maintaining the sector healthy can also obtain important insights from the results. For 
instance, different interest rate environments affect, at least to some extent, the liquidity 
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positions of banks. Hence, the regulator should be aware of this and set the banks’ regulatory 
capital buffers at an adequate level. Moreover, the balance sheet treatment of DDAs should be 
reconsidered, as the common practice is to value them at their nominal values. As shown in 
this thesis, the rent part of the deposit value can be somewhat substantial forcing the actual 
liability part to decrease. This indicates that it could be reasonable to reconsider the balance 
sheet valuation of DDAs. 
The research carried out in this thesis contains some limitations resulting in fruitful topics for 
further research. First, for analytical simplicity, it is assumed that the interest rate elasticities 
for the case bank and the whole banking sector have similar dynamics, controlling for the 
level of deposit balances. This analysis could be enhanced by conducting the research for a 
number of Finnish banks individually, assuming independent interest rate elasticity dynamics 
for each of these banks. Second, the variables used in this thesis are modeled independently 
so that their mutual correlations are not considered. Thus, it would be of interest to take these 
correlations into account in a study similar to this thesis. Third, the interest rate risk estimates 
reported here are only for positive term structure slope shocks in the market interest rate, 
causing the effect of a shock to gradually vanish and the value change of rents (liabilities) to 
be positive (negative). Hence, it would be reasonable to include negative interest rate shocks 
in the analysis as well and to focus on term structure level shocks, under which the effect 
would last longer. 
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8. APPENDIX 1: VARIABLES’ PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS 
 
Figure 17: Variables’ probability distributions 
This figure presents the probability distributions of the variables used in this thesis. However, case bank’s 
deposit balance variable (DMEUR) is excluded due to data confidentiality reasons and low competition dummy 
(LCD) because it is based on an included variable, Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). In addition to HHI, the 
variables presented here are the one month Euribor rate (RTEUR01), case bank’s demand deposit rate (RDT), 
Finnish banking sector’s demand deposit rate (MFIRDT), the spread between RTEUR01 and RDT (RSPREAD), 
the spread between RTEUR01 and MFIRDT (MFIRSPREAD), deposit balance within the banking sector 
(MFIDMEUR), unemployment rate in Finland (UNEMP), an index measuring the cycles in the economic output 
in Finland (OUTPUT) and Finnish consumer price index (CPI). 
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9. APPENDIX 2: INTEREST RATE SPREAD ELASTICITY, 
OPTIMAL DEPOSIT RATE SPREAD, AND THE DISCOUNT 
FACTOR 
Three different graphs for both the case bank and the whole banking sector are presented in 
this appendix. These are the optimal spread between short-term market rate and the DDA rate, 
the elasticity of DDA demand with respect to changes in the DDA spread, and the discount 
factor used to calculate the present value of DDA rents. These graphs are presented in Figure 
18 for the case bank and in Figure 19 for the banking sector. 
 
Figure 18: Optimal deposit interest rate spread, spread elasticity of deposit demand, and discount factor 
for case bank 
This figure presents three graphs: (i) the optimal spread between short-term market rate and the case bank’s 
demand deposit rate (OPT_RSPREAD), (ii) the elasticity of deposit demand with respect to changes in the 
spread between the short-term market rate and the deposit rate (CB_IRSE), and (iii) the discount factor used to 
calculate the present values of simulated future deposit rents (CB_DF). All these paths are obtained from the 
same simulation trial. Date (month/year) is presented in the X-axis and the simulated value for the process in the 
Y-axis. 
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Figure 19: Optimal deposit interest rate spread, spread elasticity of deposit demand, and discount factor 
for banking sector 
This figure presents three graphs: (i) the optimal spread between short-term market rate and the Finnish banking 
sector’s demand deposit rate (OPT_MFIRSPREAD), (ii) the elasticity of deposit demand with respect to changes 
in the spread between the short-term market rate and the deposit rate (MFI_IRSE), and (iii) the discount factor 
used to calculate the present values of simulated future deposit rents (MFI_DF). All these paths are obtained 
from the same simulation trial. Date (month/year) is presented in the X-axis and the simulated value for the 
process in the Y-axis. 
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10. APPENDIX 3: DEPOSIT RENT AND LIABILITY 
ESTIMATES UNDER MARKET RATE SHOCKS 
 
Table 15: Deposit rent estimates under +100 bps market rate shock 
This table presents the demand deposit (DDA) rent estimates under different deposit balance dynamics. These 
rent estimates are obtained assuming that a +100 bps shock in the short-term market rate takes place in the first 
simulated observation. Rents are reported as percentages of initial DDA balance, i.e. P0/D0, where P0 is the sum 
of discounted future monthly rents and D0 is the initial DDA balance at t = 0. Estimates are obtained from 1,000 
Monte Carlo simulation trials. z-statistics are given in parentheses. */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1 % 
level. 
 P0/D0 - +100 bps shock      
 Case bank           
   Mean Median Min Max 1st decile 9th decile 
 ConstantA 21.45 % 21.29 % 18.90 % 32.16 % 20.36 % 22.68 % 
  (629.61) ***      
D
e
c
a
y
 r
a
te
 
10 % 9.60 % 9.53 % 8.02 % 12.44 % 8.95 % 10.37 % 
 (518.10) ***      
20 % 5.95 % 5.91 % 4.75 % 7.84 % 5.48 % 6.48 % 
 (453.35) ***      
30 % 4.13 % 4.10 % 3.27 % 5.57 % 3.78 % 4.49 % 
 (431.12) ***      
40 % 3.06 % 3.05 % 2.37 % 3.99 % 2.81 % 3.33 % 
 (438.98) ***      
50 % 2.32 % 2.32 % 1.82 % 3.07 % 2.12 % 2.51 % 
  (451.06) ***      
 GrowingB 64.07 % 64.10 % 55.97 % 76.02 % 60.05 % 67.94 % 
  (657.03) ***      
        
 Sector             
 GrowingB 34.89 % 34.78 % 30.47 % 45.74 % 32.99 % 36.95 % 
   (686.44) ***           
 A DDA balance is assumed to remain constant through time.   
 B DDA balance is assumed to grow according to an AR(2) forecast.   
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Table 16: Deposit liability estimates under +100 bps market rate shock 
This table presents the demand deposit (DDA) liability estimates under different deposit balance dynamics. 
Liability values (L0) are defined as the nominal value of DDAs minus the rent and they are reported as 
percentages of initial DDA balance, i.e. L0/D0. These liability estimates are obtained assuming that a +100 bps 
shock in the short-term market rate takes place in the first simulated observation. Estimates are obtained from 
1,000 Monte Carlo simulation trials. 
 L0/D0 - +100 bps shock      
 Case bank           
   Mean Median Min Max 1st decile 9th decile 
 ConstantA 78.55 % 78.71 % 67.84 % 81.10 % 77.32 % 79.64 % 
D
e
c
a
y
 r
a
te
 10 % 90.40 % 90.47 % 87.56 % 91.98 % 89.63 % 91.05 % 
20 % 94.05 % 94.09 % 92.16 % 95.25 % 93.52 % 94.52 % 
30 % 95.87 % 95.90 % 94.43 % 96.73 % 95.51 % 96.22 % 
40 % 96.94 % 96.95 % 96.01 % 97.63 % 96.67 % 97.19 % 
50 % 97.68 % 97.68 % 96.93 % 98.18 % 97.49 % 97.88 % 
 GrowingB 35.93 % 35.90 % 23.98 % 44.03 % 32.06 % 39.95 % 
        
 Sector             
 GrowingB 65.11 % 65.22 % 54.26 % 69.53 % 63.05 % 67.01 % 
 A DDA balance is assumed to remain constant through time.   
 B DDA balance is assumed to grow according to an AR(2) forecast.   
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Table 17: Deposit rent estimates under +200 bps market rate shock 
This table presents the demand deposit (DDA) rent estimates under different deposit balance dynamics. These 
rent estimates are obtained assuming that a +200 bps shock in the short-term market rate takes place in the first 
simulated observation. Rents are reported as percentages of initial DDA balance, i.e. P0/D0, where P0 is the sum 
of discounted future monthly rents and D0 is the initial DDA balance at t = 0. Estimates are obtained from 1,000 
Monte Carlo simulation trials. z-statistics are given in parentheses. */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1 % 
level. 
 P0/D0 - +200 bps shock      
 Case bank           
   Mean Median Min Max 1st decile 9th decile 
 ConstantA 23.38 % 23.14 % 20.19 % 34.19 % 21.73 % 25.39 % 
  (481.23) ***      
D
e
c
a
y
 r
a
te
 
10 % 11.17 % 10.98 % 8.93 % 17.71 % 10.04 % 12.57 % 
 (321.14) ***      
20 % 7.17 % 7.04 % 5.58 % 12.94 % 6.35 % 8.13 % 
 (286.45) ***      
30 % 5.17 % 5.06 % 4.18 % 9.05 % 4.54 % 5.91 % 
 (275.72) ***      
40 % 3.88 % 3.81 % 3.05 % 5.77 % 3.44 % 4.44 % 
 (301.45) ***      
50 % 3.03 % 2.98 % 2.36 % 4.67 % 2.68 % 3.42 % 
  (312.10) ***      
 GrowingB 66.60 % 66.35 % 56.46 % 81.41 % 62.01 % 71.43 % 
  (580.44) ***      
        
 Sector             
 GrowingB 36.99 % 36.91 % 31.27 % 48.57 % 34.55 % 39.52 % 
   (571.33) ***           
 A DDA balance is assumed to remain constant through time.   
 B DDA balance is assumed to grow according to an AR(2) forecast.   
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Table 18: Deposit liability estimates under +200 bps market rate shock 
This table presents the demand deposit (DDA) liability estimates under different deposit balance dynamics. 
Liability values (L0) are defined as the nominal value of DDAs minus the rent and they are reported as 
percentages of initial DDA balance, i.e. L0/D0. These liability estimates are obtained assuming that a +200 bps 
shock in the short-term market rate takes place in the first simulated observation. Estimates are obtained from 
1,000 Monte Carlo simulation trials. 
 L0/D0 - +200 bps shock      
 Case bank           
   Mean Median Min Max 1st decile 9th decile 
 ConstantA 76.62 % 76.86 % 65.81 % 79.81 % 74.61 % 78.27 % 
D
e
c
a
y
 r
a
te
 10 % 88.83 % 89.02 % 82.29 % 91.07 % 87.43 % 89.96 % 
20 % 92.83 % 92.96 % 87.06 % 94.42 % 91.87 % 93.65 % 
30 % 94.83 % 94.94 % 90.95 % 95.82 % 94.09 % 95.46 % 
40 % 96.12 % 96.19 % 94.23 % 96.95 % 95.56 % 96.56 % 
50 % 96.97 % 97.02 % 95.33 % 97.64 % 96.58 % 97.32 % 
 GrowingB 33.40 % 33.65 % 18.59 % 43.54 % 28.57 % 37.99 % 
        
 Sector             
 GrowingB 63.01 % 63.09 % 51.43 % 68.73 % 60.48 % 65.45 % 
 A DDA balance is assumed to remain constant through time.   
 B DDA balance is assumed to grow according to an AR(2) forecast.   
 
